From 04d2af28546d8ae1c889df3938a11c38ce0e3463 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Herton R. Krzesinski" Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 15:35:02 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 01/12] ipc,sem: fix use after free on IPC_RMID after a task using same semaphore set exits commit 602b8593d2b4138c10e922eeaafe306f6b51817b upstream. The current semaphore code allows a potential use after free: in exit_sem we may free the task's sem_undo_list while there is still another task looping through the same semaphore set and cleaning the sem_undo list at freeary function (the task called IPC_RMID for the same semaphore set). For example, with a test program [1] running which keeps forking a lot of processes (which then do a semop call with SEM_UNDO flag), and with the parent right after removing the semaphore set with IPC_RMID, and a kernel built with CONFIG_SLAB, CONFIG_SLAB_DEBUG and CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK, you can easily see something like the following in the kernel log: Slab corruption (Not tainted): kmalloc-64 start=ffff88003b45c1c0, len=64 000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkk.kkkkkkk 010: ff ff ff ff 6b 6b 6b 6b ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ....kkkk........ Prev obj: start=ffff88003b45c180, len=64 000: 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a .....N......ZZZZ 010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c0 fb 01 37 00 88 ff ff ...........7.... Next obj: start=ffff88003b45c200, len=64 000: 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a .....N......ZZZZ 010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 68 29 a7 3c 00 88 ff ff ........h).<.... BUG: spinlock wrong CPU on CPU#2, test/18028 general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables binfmt_misc ppdev input_leds joydev parport_pc parport floppy serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_rng virtio_console virtio_net iosf_mbi crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr qxl ttm drm_kms_helper drm snd_hda_codec_generic i2c_piix4 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore crc32c_intel virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio pata_acpi ata_generic [last unloaded: speedstep_lib] CPU: 2 PID: 18028 Comm: test Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014 RIP: spin_dump+0x53/0xc0 Call Trace: spin_bug+0x30/0x40 do_raw_spin_unlock+0x71/0xa0 _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x10 freeary+0x82/0x2a0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10 semctl_down.clone.0+0xce/0x160 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa8/0x100 SyS_semctl+0x236/0x2c0 ? syscall_trace_leave+0xde/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Code: 8b 80 88 03 00 00 48 8d 88 60 05 00 00 48 c7 c7 a0 2c a4 81 31 c0 65 8b 15 eb 40 f3 7e e8 08 31 68 00 4d 85 e4 44 8b 4b 08 74 5e <45> 8b 84 24 88 03 00 00 49 8d 8c 24 60 05 00 00 8b 53 04 48 89 RIP [] spin_dump+0x53/0xc0 RSP ---[ end trace 783ebb76612867a0 ]--- NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 22s! [test:18053] Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables binfmt_misc ppdev input_leds joydev parport_pc parport floppy serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_rng virtio_console virtio_net iosf_mbi crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr qxl ttm drm_kms_helper drm snd_hda_codec_generic i2c_piix4 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore crc32c_intel virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio pata_acpi ata_generic [last unloaded: speedstep_lib] CPU: 3 PID: 18053 Comm: test Tainted: G D 4.2.0-rc5+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014 RIP: native_read_tsc+0x0/0x20 Call Trace: ? delay_tsc+0x40/0x70 __delay+0xf/0x20 do_raw_spin_lock+0x96/0x140 _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10 sem_lock_and_putref+0x11/0x70 SYSC_semtimedop+0x7bf/0x960 ? handle_mm_fault+0xbf6/0x1880 ? dequeue_task_fair+0x79/0x4a0 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? kfree_debugcheck+0x16/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa8/0x100 ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70 ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x139/0x160 SyS_semtimedop+0xe/0x10 SyS_semop+0x10/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Code: 47 10 83 e8 01 85 c0 89 47 10 75 08 65 48 89 3d 1f 74 ff 7e c9 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 87 17 04 00 66 90 c9 c3 0f 1f 00 <55> 48 89 e5 0f 31 89 c1 48 89 d0 48 c1 e0 20 89 c9 48 09 c8 c9 Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks I wasn't able to trigger any badness on a recent kernel without the proper config debugs enabled, however I have softlockup reports on some kernel versions, in the semaphore code, which are similar as above (the scenario is seen on some servers running IBM DB2 which uses semaphore syscalls). The patch here fixes the race against freeary, by acquiring or waiting on the sem_undo_list lock as necessary (exit_sem can race with freeary, while freeary sets un->semid to -1 and removes the same sem_undo from list_proc or when it removes the last sem_undo). After the patch I'm unable to reproduce the problem using the test case [1]. [1] Test case used below: #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define NSEM 1 #define NSET 5 int sid[NSET]; void thread() { struct sembuf op; int s; uid_t pid = getuid(); s = rand() % NSET; op.sem_num = pid % NSEM; op.sem_op = 1; op.sem_flg = SEM_UNDO; semop(sid[s], &op, 1); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } void create_set() { int i, j; pid_t p; union { int val; struct semid_ds *buf; unsigned short int *array; struct seminfo *__buf; } un; /* Create and initialize semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { sid[i] = semget(IPC_PRIVATE , NSEM, 0644 | IPC_CREAT); if (sid[i] < 0) { perror("semget"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } un.val = 0; for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { for (j = 0; j < NSEM; j++) { if (semctl(sid[i], j, SETVAL, un) < 0) perror("semctl"); } } /* Launch threads that operate on semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSEM * NSET * NSET; i++) { p = fork(); if (p < 0) perror("fork"); if (p == 0) thread(); } /* Free semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { if (semctl(sid[i], NSEM, IPC_RMID)) perror("IPC_RMID"); } /* Wait for forked processes to exit */ while (wait(NULL)) { if (errno == ECHILD) break; }; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pid_t p; srand(time(NULL)); while (1) { p = fork(); if (p < 0) { perror("fork"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (p == 0) { create_set(); goto end; } /* Wait for forked processes to exit */ while (wait(NULL)) { if (errno == ECHILD) break; }; } end: return 0; } [akpm@linux-foundation.org: use normal comment layout] Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski Acked-by: Manfred Spraul Cc: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: Rafael Aquini CC: Aristeu Rozanski Cc: David Jeffery Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- ipc/sem.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c index db9d241af13..afb0e62af95 100644 --- a/ipc/sem.c +++ b/ipc/sem.c @@ -2049,17 +2049,28 @@ void exit_sem(struct task_struct *tsk) rcu_read_lock(); un = list_entry_rcu(ulp->list_proc.next, struct sem_undo, list_proc); - if (&un->list_proc == &ulp->list_proc) - semid = -1; - else - semid = un->semid; - - if (semid == -1) { + if (&un->list_proc == &ulp->list_proc) { + /* + * We must wait for freeary() before freeing this ulp, + * in case we raced with last sem_undo. There is a small + * possibility where we exit while freeary() didn't + * finish unlocking sem_undo_list. + */ + spin_unlock_wait(&ulp->lock); rcu_read_unlock(); break; } + spin_lock(&ulp->lock); + semid = un->semid; + spin_unlock(&ulp->lock); - sma = sem_obtain_object_check(tsk->nsproxy->ipc_ns, un->semid); + /* exit_sem raced with IPC_RMID, nothing to do */ + if (semid == -1) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + continue; + } + + sma = sem_obtain_object_check(tsk->nsproxy->ipc_ns, semid); /* exit_sem raced with IPC_RMID, nothing to do */ if (IS_ERR(sma)) { rcu_read_unlock(); From 30e5bc30f582e58bb2ee1b89838384dd9e9f9809 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manfred Spraul Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 15:35:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 02/12] ipc/sem.c: update/correct memory barriers commit 3ed1f8a99d70ea1cd1508910eb107d0edcae5009 upstream. sem_lock() did not properly pair memory barriers: !spin_is_locked() and spin_unlock_wait() are both only control barriers. The code needs an acquire barrier, otherwise the cpu might perform read operations before the lock test. As no primitive exists inside and since it seems noone wants another primitive, the code creates a local primitive within ipc/sem.c. With regards to -stable: The change of sem_wait_array() is a bugfix, the change to sem_lock() is a nop (just a preprocessor redefinition to improve the readability). The bugfix is necessary for all kernels that use sem_wait_array() (i.e.: starting from 3.10). Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" Cc: Kirill Tkhai Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Davidlohr Bueso Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- ipc/sem.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c index afb0e62af95..47a15192b8b 100644 --- a/ipc/sem.c +++ b/ipc/sem.c @@ -252,6 +252,16 @@ static void sem_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *head) ipc_rcu_free(head); } +/* + * spin_unlock_wait() and !spin_is_locked() are not memory barriers, they + * are only control barriers. + * The code must pair with spin_unlock(&sem->lock) or + * spin_unlock(&sem_perm.lock), thus just the control barrier is insufficient. + * + * smp_rmb() is sufficient, as writes cannot pass the control barrier. + */ +#define ipc_smp_acquire__after_spin_is_unlocked() smp_rmb() + /* * Wait until all currently ongoing simple ops have completed. * Caller must own sem_perm.lock. @@ -275,6 +285,7 @@ static void sem_wait_array(struct sem_array *sma) sem = sma->sem_base + i; spin_unlock_wait(&sem->lock); } + ipc_smp_acquire__after_spin_is_unlocked(); } /* @@ -326,8 +337,13 @@ static inline int sem_lock(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, /* Then check that the global lock is free */ if (!spin_is_locked(&sma->sem_perm.lock)) { - /* spin_is_locked() is not a memory barrier */ - smp_mb(); + /* + * We need a memory barrier with acquire semantics, + * otherwise we can race with another thread that does: + * complex_count++; + * spin_unlock(sem_perm.lock); + */ + ipc_smp_acquire__after_spin_is_unlocked(); /* Now repeat the test of complex_count: * It can't change anymore until we drop sem->lock. From 50deac6cf762a571d99f6154ad7ef709bdfd6e8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wanpeng Li Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 15:34:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 03/12] mm/hwpoison: fix page refcount of unknown non LRU page commit 4f32be677b124a49459e2603321c7a5605ceb9f8 upstream. After trying to drain pages from pagevec/pageset, we try to get reference count of the page again, however, the reference count of the page is not reduced if the page is still not on LRU list. Fix it by adding the put_page() to drop the page reference which is from __get_any_page(). Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/memory-failure.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index ca96f411b03..f97d709594e 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -1473,6 +1473,8 @@ static int get_any_page(struct page *page, unsigned long pfn, int flags) */ ret = __get_any_page(page, pfn, 0); if (!PageLRU(page)) { + /* Drop page reference which is from __get_any_page() */ + put_page(page); pr_info("soft_offline: %#lx: unknown non LRU page type %lx\n", pfn, page->flags); return -EIO; From 1f6661e25639001c9fb5922affe9392b3729fff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Zijlstra Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2015 10:32:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/12] perf: Fix fasync handling on inherited events commit fed66e2cdd4f127a43fd11b8d92a99bdd429528c upstream. Vince reported that the fasync signal stuff doesn't work proper for inherited events. So fix that. Installing fasync allocates memory and sets filp->f_flags |= FASYNC, which upon the demise of the file descriptor ensures the allocation is freed and state is updated. Now for perf, we can have the events stick around for a while after the original FD is dead because of references from child events. So we cannot copy the fasync pointer around. We can however consistently use the parent's fasync, as that will be updated. Reported-and-Tested-by: Vince Weaver Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho deMelo Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: eranian@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1434011521.1495.71.camel@twins Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/events/core.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 7daf52c340c..d9b0aad17db 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -3993,12 +3993,20 @@ static const struct file_operations perf_fops = { * to user-space before waking everybody up. */ +static inline struct fasync_struct **perf_event_fasync(struct perf_event *event) +{ + /* only the parent has fasync state */ + if (event->parent) + event = event->parent; + return &event->fasync; +} + void perf_event_wakeup(struct perf_event *event) { ring_buffer_wakeup(event); if (event->pending_kill) { - kill_fasync(&event->fasync, SIGIO, event->pending_kill); + kill_fasync(perf_event_fasync(event), SIGIO, event->pending_kill); event->pending_kill = 0; } } @@ -5153,7 +5161,7 @@ static int __perf_event_overflow(struct perf_event *event, else perf_event_output(event, data, regs); - if (event->fasync && event->pending_kill) { + if (*perf_event_fasync(event) && event->pending_kill) { event->pending_wakeup = 1; irq_work_queue(&event->pending); } From 9cdd5586f1e836ffd877c79c74240ee46fea5bd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joe Thornber Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2015 15:10:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 05/12] dm thin metadata: delete btrees when releasing metadata snapshot commit 7f518ad0a212e2a6fd68630e176af1de395070a7 upstream. The device details and mapping trees were just being decremented before. Now btree_del() is called to do a deep delete. Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c index 3b1503dc1f1..43f6250baad 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c @@ -1281,8 +1281,8 @@ static int __release_metadata_snap(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd) return r; disk_super = dm_block_data(copy); - dm_sm_dec_block(pmd->metadata_sm, le64_to_cpu(disk_super->data_mapping_root)); - dm_sm_dec_block(pmd->metadata_sm, le64_to_cpu(disk_super->device_details_root)); + dm_btree_del(&pmd->info, le64_to_cpu(disk_super->data_mapping_root)); + dm_btree_del(&pmd->details_info, le64_to_cpu(disk_super->device_details_root)); dm_sm_dec_block(pmd->metadata_sm, held_root); return dm_tm_unlock(pmd->tm, copy); From 98e5059b209ae26f4d4fee4615d819183ed99ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Weinberger Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2015 00:06:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/12] localmodconfig: Use Kbuild files too commit c0ddc8c745b7f89c50385fd7aa03c78dc543fa7a upstream. In kbuild it is allowed to define objects in files named "Makefile" and "Kbuild". Currently localmodconfig reads objects only from "Makefile"s and misses modules like nouveau. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437948415-16290-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at Reported-and-tested-by: Leonidas Spyropoulos Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- scripts/kconfig/streamline_config.pl | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/streamline_config.pl b/scripts/kconfig/streamline_config.pl index 4606cdfb859..7dd7c391b4d 100644 --- a/scripts/kconfig/streamline_config.pl +++ b/scripts/kconfig/streamline_config.pl @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ my $ksource = ($ARGV[0] ? $ARGV[0] : '.'); my $kconfig = $ARGV[1]; my $lsmod_file = $ENV{'LSMOD'}; -my @makefiles = `find $ksource -name Makefile 2>/dev/null`; +my @makefiles = `find $ksource -name Makefile -or -name Kbuild 2>/dev/null`; chomp @makefiles; my %depends; From 94c379756b6749d7641f883fa5307abe9da3964c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Walle Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 11:00:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/12] EDAC, ppc4xx: Access mci->csrows array elements properly commit 5c16179b550b9fd8114637a56b153c9768ea06a5 upstream. The commit de3910eb79ac ("edac: change the mem allocation scheme to make Documentation/kobject.txt happy") changed the memory allocation for the csrows member. But ppc4xx_edac was forgotten in the patch. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Cc: linux-edac Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437469253-8611-1-git-send-email-michael@walle.cc Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/edac/ppc4xx_edac.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/edac/ppc4xx_edac.c b/drivers/edac/ppc4xx_edac.c index ef6b7e08f48..5c361f3c66a 100644 --- a/drivers/edac/ppc4xx_edac.c +++ b/drivers/edac/ppc4xx_edac.c @@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static int ppc4xx_edac_init_csrows(struct mem_ctl_info *mci, u32 mcopt1) */ for (row = 0; row < mci->nr_csrows; row++) { - struct csrow_info *csi = &mci->csrows[row]; + struct csrow_info *csi = mci->csrows[row]; /* * Get the configuration settings for this From e7e8231c599e65e783eda3cd399c2b88032ff42d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Deucher Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 15:28:49 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 08/12] drm/radeon: add new OLAND pci id commit e037239e5e7b61007763984aa35a8329596d8c88 upstream. Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/drm/drm_pciids.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/drm/drm_pciids.h b/include/drm/drm_pciids.h index d7b717090f2..2b5c3bc3b08 100644 --- a/include/drm/drm_pciids.h +++ b/include/drm/drm_pciids.h @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ {0x1002, 0x6610, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_OLAND|RADEON_NEW_MEMMAP}, \ {0x1002, 0x6611, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_OLAND|RADEON_NEW_MEMMAP}, \ {0x1002, 0x6613, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_OLAND|RADEON_NEW_MEMMAP}, \ + {0x1002, 0x6617, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_OLAND|RADEON_IS_MOBILITY|RADEON_NEW_MEMMAP}, \ {0x1002, 0x6620, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_OLAND|RADEON_IS_MOBILITY|RADEON_NEW_MEMMAP}, \ {0x1002, 0x6621, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_OLAND|RADEON_IS_MOBILITY|RADEON_NEW_MEMMAP}, \ {0x1002, 0x6623, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_OLAND|RADEON_IS_MOBILITY|RADEON_NEW_MEMMAP}, \ From 0a1b726993ae45ffda33dde0a5760926f682faf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bart Van Assche Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2015 14:20:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 09/12] libfc: Fix fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd() commit 8f2777f53e3d5ad8ef2a176a4463a5c8e1a16431 upstream. Since fc_fcp_cleanup_cmd() can sleep this function must not be called while holding a spinlock. This patch avoids that fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd() triggers the following bug: BUG: scheduling while atomic: sg_reset/1512/0x00000202 1 lock held by sg_reset/1512: #0: (&(&fsp->scsi_pkt_lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [] fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd.isra.21+0xa5/0x150 [libfc] Preemption disabled at:[] fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd.isra.21+0xa5/0x150 [libfc] Call Trace: [] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b [] __schedule_bug+0x6c/0xd0 [] __schedule+0x71a/0xa10 [] schedule+0x32/0x80 [] fc_seq_set_resp+0xac/0x100 [libfc] [] fc_exch_done+0x41/0x60 [libfc] [] fc_fcp_cleanup_each_cmd.isra.21+0xcf/0x150 [libfc] [] fc_eh_device_reset+0x1c3/0x270 [libfc] [] scsi_try_bus_device_reset+0x29/0x60 [] scsi_ioctl_reset+0x258/0x2d0 [] scsi_ioctl+0x150/0x440 [] sd_ioctl+0xad/0x120 [] blkdev_ioctl+0x1b6/0x810 [] block_ioctl+0x38/0x40 [] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2f8/0x530 [] SyS_ioctl+0x81/0xa0 [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x7a Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche Signed-off-by: Vasu Dev Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_fcp.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_fcp.c b/drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_fcp.c index 09c81b2f216..42c46dc1953 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_fcp.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_fcp.c @@ -1039,11 +1039,26 @@ restart: fc_fcp_pkt_hold(fsp); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&si->scsi_queue_lock, flags); - if (!fc_fcp_lock_pkt(fsp)) { + spin_lock_bh(&fsp->scsi_pkt_lock); + if (!(fsp->state & FC_SRB_COMPL)) { + fsp->state |= FC_SRB_COMPL; + /* + * TODO: dropping scsi_pkt_lock and then reacquiring + * again around fc_fcp_cleanup_cmd() is required, + * since fc_fcp_cleanup_cmd() calls into + * fc_seq_set_resp() and that func preempts cpu using + * schedule. May be schedule and related code should be + * removed instead of unlocking here to avoid scheduling + * while atomic bug. + */ + spin_unlock_bh(&fsp->scsi_pkt_lock); + fc_fcp_cleanup_cmd(fsp, error); + + spin_lock_bh(&fsp->scsi_pkt_lock); fc_io_compl(fsp); - fc_fcp_unlock_pkt(fsp); } + spin_unlock_bh(&fsp->scsi_pkt_lock); fc_fcp_pkt_release(fsp); spin_lock_irqsave(&si->scsi_queue_lock, flags); From d51689e20adbf8fe2c3999939da8d61ed2ccbc58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Horia Geant? Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 20:19:20 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 10/12] crypto: caam - fix memory corruption in ahash_final_ctx commit b310c178e6d897f82abb9da3af1cd7c02b09f592 upstream. When doing pointer operation for accessing the HW S/G table, a value representing number of entries (and not number of bytes) must be used. Fixes: 045e36780f115 ("crypto: caam - ahash hmac support") Signed-off-by: Horia Geant? Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c index 84573b4d6f9..dda43cc4b6c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c @@ -895,13 +895,14 @@ static int ahash_final_ctx(struct ahash_request *req) state->buflen_1; u32 *sh_desc = ctx->sh_desc_fin, *desc; dma_addr_t ptr = ctx->sh_desc_fin_dma; - int sec4_sg_bytes; + int sec4_sg_bytes, sec4_sg_src_index; int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(ahash); struct ahash_edesc *edesc; int ret = 0; int sh_len; - sec4_sg_bytes = (1 + (buflen ? 1 : 0)) * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry); + sec4_sg_src_index = 1 + (buflen ? 1 : 0); + sec4_sg_bytes = sec4_sg_src_index * sizeof(struct sec4_sg_entry); /* allocate space for base edesc and hw desc commands, link tables */ edesc = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ahash_edesc) + DESC_JOB_IO_LEN + @@ -928,7 +929,7 @@ static int ahash_final_ctx(struct ahash_request *req) state->buf_dma = try_buf_map_to_sec4_sg(jrdev, edesc->sec4_sg + 1, buf, state->buf_dma, buflen, last_buflen); - (edesc->sec4_sg + sec4_sg_bytes - 1)->len |= SEC4_SG_LEN_FIN; + (edesc->sec4_sg + sec4_sg_src_index - 1)->len |= SEC4_SG_LEN_FIN; append_seq_in_ptr(desc, edesc->sec4_sg_dma, ctx->ctx_len + buflen, LDST_SGF); From 82c9aed33b8a6ca79121d54f1504e9df6b0479cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yann Droneaud Date: Mon, 17 Nov 2014 23:02:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 11/12] arm64/mm: Remove hack in mmap randomize layout commit d6c763afab142a85e4770b4bc2a5f40f256d5c5d upstream. Since commit 8a0a9bd4db63 ('random: make get_random_int() more random'), get_random_int() returns a random value for each call, so comment and hack introduced in mmap_rnd() as part of commit 1d18c47c735e ('arm64: MMU fault handling and page table management') are incorrects. Commit 1d18c47c735e seems to use the same hack introduced by commit a5adc91a4b44 ('powerpc: Ensure random space between stack and mmaps'), latter copied in commit 5a0efea09f42 ('sparc64: Sharpen address space randomization calculations.'). But both architectures were cleaned up as part of commit fa8cbaaf5a68 ('powerpc+sparc64/mm: Remove hack in mmap randomize layout') as hack is no more needed since commit 8a0a9bd4db63. So the present patch removes the comment and the hack around get_random_int() on AArch64's mmap_rnd(). Cc: David S. Miller Cc: Anton Blanchard Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Acked-by: Will Deacon Acked-by: Dan McGee Signed-off-by: Yann Droneaud Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Cc: Matthias Brugger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c index 7c7be785563..8aaf073ee07 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c @@ -47,22 +47,14 @@ static int mmap_is_legacy(void) return sysctl_legacy_va_layout; } -/* - * Since get_random_int() returns the same value within a 1 jiffy window, we - * will almost always get the same randomisation for the stack and mmap - * region. This will mean the relative distance between stack and mmap will be - * the same. - * - * To avoid this we can shift the randomness by 1 bit. - */ static unsigned long mmap_rnd(void) { unsigned long rnd = 0; if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) - rnd = (long)get_random_int() & (STACK_RND_MASK >> 1); + rnd = (long)get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK; - return rnd << (PAGE_SHIFT + 1); + return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT; } static unsigned long mmap_base(void) From 2ec142700ec00142cdcd8c6529ad77cb9ec7a026 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2015 09:08:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 12/12] Linux 3.10.88 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 0d4fd642734..e94ce68ecf8 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ VERSION = 3 PATCHLEVEL = 10 -SUBLEVEL = 87 +SUBLEVEL = 88 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = TOSSUG Baby Fish